
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THE

WAR IN THE EAST.

FROM

THE YEAR 1853 TILL JULY 1855.

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AN HISTORICO-CRITICAL SKETCH OF

THE CAMPAIGNS ON THE DANUBE, IN ASIA, AND IN THE CRIMEA
WITH A GLANCE AT THE PROBABLE CONTINGENCIES
OF THE NEXT CAMPAIGN.

BY

GENERAL GEORGE KLAPKA,

AUTHOR OF "MEMOIRS OF THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE IN HUNGARY," ETC. ETC.

TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT

BY LT.-COL. A. MEDNYÁNSZKY.

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PREFACE.

SHORTLY after the commencement of the present war I set out for the East, with the intention of forming an independent opinion of its leading men, and their manner of carrying on the contest. It was only natural that, in more respects than one, I should take a deep interest in those proceedings, and that, on leaving the scene of action, I should still continue to follow attentively the entangled course of the grand drama, the first act of which is probably drawing to a close.

The information I acquired, together with the authentic data kindly supplied by my friends in the East, constitute the materials of the present sketch, which has no higher pretensions than that of contributing to the future history of the

war. I have intentionally avoided going into details, my sole motive being to elucidate in a simple and concise manner that all-important question: Whether the struggle — as it has hitherto been conducted—will lead to the attainment of the object held out to the Western nations by their Governments?

GEORGE KLAPKA.

THE LAKE OF GENEVA,
August, 1855.

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THE WAR IN THE EAST.

CHAPTER I.

THE WAR ON THE DANUBE.

I.—OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES. INTERFERENCE OF DIPLOMACY WITH OPERATIONS; ITS CONSEQUENCES.

In the spring of 1853 the Czar Nicholas thought the time had arrived, when he might attempt a grand move towards that object which Russian policy in the East had, for the last two centuries, pursued with such perseverance and success.

The mutual political relations of the great powers; the compliance of the Porte with the claims of Austria; the doubtful successes of the Turkish arms in Montenegro, all tended to hurry the Czar into the lists against Turkey. He accordingly put forward certain categorical demands, which, had they been acceded to, would have placed him at the head of eleven millions of Turkish subjects. The

Divan refused to submit to such insulting proposals, whereupon the occupation of the Principalities by the Russians ensued. A warlike demonstration was now to extort from the Porte what Mentschikoff's menaces and diplomatic intrigues had failed to accomplish; but in this Russia was utterly mistaken, for the Turks, instead of giving up their political independence without a struggle, resolved to face the aggressors, and, after having repeatedly summoned them to evacuate their territory, they at length declared war.

The Russian troops which crossed the Pruth in July, 1853, together with their reserve in Bessarabia, were the fourth and part of the fifth army corps, and consisted of 70,000 men. With such inferior forces, insufficient even for a successful defence of the Principalities, it was evident that, for the moment at any rate, Russia had no other object in view, but the intimidation of the "sick man."

Prince Gortschakoff, commander-in-chief of the army of occupation, considering an attack on the part of the Turks as beyond the limits of possibility, dispersed his troops in the most unaccountable manner throughout Wallachia, from Kalafat to Galatz, in no place retaining a considerable force, and himself taking up his quarters at Bucharest with as much indifference as if it had been in time of peace.

The Turks, on the other hand, displayed great activity. They sent all their disposable forces to the Danube, put their fortresses, which in later times had been much neglected, into a state of defence, fortified diverse points along the river, and, during the summer and autumn, levied an army, which, at the outbreak of hostilities, amounted to not less than 90,000 regular and 30,000 irregular troops. The chief command was entrusted to Omer Pasha, a general combining both energy and military experience. Omer Pasha rested with his left wing upon Widdin; the main army was concentrated between Rustschuk, Silistria, and Shumla, and his right wing pushed forward into the Dobrudja.

In the beginning of October, the Turkish commander-in-chief sent a final summons to Prince Gortschakoff to evacuate the Principalities, which not being complied with, he ordered hostilities to be commenced on all points. The first shots fell before Isaaktscha, against a part of the Russian flotilla on the Danube. This was followed by a movement on the left wing, where a corps crossed the Danube to Kalafat, and, after having dislodged the enemy, occupied and fortified that place. More important were the operations of the main army. Here Omer Pasha commanded between 50,000 and 60,000 men in person, and at Toturkan, near Rustschuk, effected

a passage across the river. His van not only succeeded in gaining a firm footing upon the left bank, near Oltenitza, but also in victoriously repulsing a furious attack of a strong division of Russians, on the 4th of November. The world now justly expected that these first advantages would be followed up by the rapid advance of the Turks upon Bucharest; when eight days later news spread of their having withdrawn from the Wallachian bank of the Danube, and retired into winter quarters at Shumla and its vicinity.

By the victory on the 4th of November, Omer Pasha obtained possession of the road to Bucharest, which is only twenty-five miles distant from Oltenitza, and, as the superiority, both physical and moral, was on his side, the Russians, scattered as they were over the whole land, could not have opposed him on this line with more than 25,000 men. How was it that Omer Pasha did not turn the first enthusiasm of his troops to a better account? Why did he not strike a decisive blow against the Russians at a moment when they were thrown off their guard and at a loss how to act? The mystery is now cleared up: diplomacy had put a stop to the advance of the Turks. At the news of the outbreak of hostilities and the passage of the Danube by the Turks, the Austrian Internuncio at Constantinople immediately made such

vivid representations to the French and English ambassadors as to the danger that would accrue to the peace of Europe from a farther conflict between Turkey and Russia, that both the ambassadors of the western powers felt it incumbent upon them to use their influence with the Sultan, not only to order Omer Pasha to desist from pursuing the advantages he had already gained, but also to recross the Danube. The Turkish general obeyed, and thus one of the most favourable opportunities of humiliating the aggressor was lost.*

II.—SUBSERVIENCY AND NEGLECT ON ONE SIDE; DEFIANCE AND INSOLENCE ON THE OTHER.

After a few attempts at negociations the conviction gained ground that every hope of a peaceful solution of the question was illusory, and that the conflict would prove of a more serious nature and of longer duration than was at first surmised. The Western governments, nevertheless, thought that the moment for their active co-operation in the war had not yet arrived; though it could not be denied that energetic measures on their part would have forwarded their own as well as the interests of the Turks, for whom, as their allies, they were bound to

* Although the season was too far advanced to commence decisive operations; yet for the Turks the moment was extremely favourable to carry out bold exploits against the isolated corps of their enemy.

do all in their power, both in promoting the development of their means of resistance, and in not leaving a stone unturned to diminish the chances of Russia's success in the field. The wisest course, therefore, would have been to occupy Lesser Wallachia, and to summon its inhabitants—who most heartily detest the Russian rule—to join the standard of the Crescent. On the passage of the Turks from Widdin across the Danube to Kalafat, the whole of Lesser Wallachia, particularly the mountain districts—the seat of a hardy and war-like race—had been evacuated by the Russians; and Wallachian patriots volunteered to form the population throughout the valleys of the Carpathians into armed bands, and to keep up a guerilla warfare in the enemy's flank and rear. It was also proposed to organise an army corps of Wallachians in the places along the Danube, which, when completed, would co-operate with the Turkish army in the field. The occupation of Lesser Wallachia offered besides the following advantages:

1. A position in the flank of the Russian main army, which would have greatly embarrassed the latter in its ensuing operations against the Turkish centre.

2. Vast material resources for the use of the army, which would otherwise fall to the share of the enemy.

3. The possibility of retaining ascendancy over the inhabitants of the Danubian provinces, and thus preventing the extension of the newly established Russian rule.

4. Keeping off the direct bias and pressure of Russia over her compatriots and co-religionists in Serbia; and

5. The protection of the road to Sophia.—But here again diplomacy put in its veto under pretence of not having entirely abandoned the hope of a final reconciliation of the contending parties, which would be considerably lessened by the foregoing decisive steps, and above all, that it would prove a source of much uneasiness to Austria, if the seat of war were transplanted so near to her frontiers.

Thus it came to pass, thanks to the prudence and foresight of diplomacy, that not one of the many chances of success which presented themselves at the commencement of the war, was turned to account, and that the Russians were allowed to summon large reinforcements as well as reserves, and to raise their army in the Principalities to so imposing a number, that during the winter it already greatly out-numbered that of the Turks.

The compliance and weakness of the Ottoman government, combined with the blind zeal of their allies in the work of peace, only contributed to render their adversaries the more daring and

insolent in their enterprises both on land and sea. For, although it was said that the Russians would leave the political institutions of the Principalities intact, no sooner had the first columns set foot on Moldavian ground, than they signalised themselves by appropriating the tribute, destined for the Sultan, to the use of their master, at the same time laying hands upon the public revenues. The governments of both the provinces were, previous to the declaration of war, already cut off from all communication with Constantinople, the Hospodars compelled to resign, and in lieu of them Russian military governors appointed. The national militia was embodied into the Russian army, and finally the rest of the Turkish dependencies were deluged with emissaries, charged to incite the Sclavonian and Greek population to insurrection and rebellion. Russia had, in the face of Europe, solemnly pledged herself to the observance of the strictest defensive; yet on the first occasion that seemed propitious to her scheme, she dealt an annihilating blow at that part of the Turkish fleet stationed before Sinope. The court of St. Petersburg called the attack of the Turks on the Danube an outrage against the law of nations, while it showered praises on the victors of Sinope, and, in order to flatter Russian pride, likened the massacre there to the day of Tschesme.

III.—THE MASSACRE AT SINOPE, AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.

A steamer, which alone escaped the destruction at Sinope, carried the account thereof to Constantinople. The Turkish inhabitants, exasperated in the extreme, declared boldly and openly that the cause of that dire misfortune was mainly to be ascribed to the tardiness as well as to the ill-will of their Christian allies, whose interest it was to damp the courage of the Mussulmen, and thus compel them to submit to an ignominious peace. And, indeed, if we calmly consider the proceedings of the allied fleets before and after that catastrophe, we cannot be surprised at such an impression gaining ground, not only amongst the Turks, but even amongst the Christians.

After declaring war, the Sultan requested his allies to send their fleets to the Bosphorus. The request was complied with, and the fleets arrived there in the beginning of November. From that moment all the movements on sea were conjointly directed by the French, English and Turkish admirals. They all acquiesced in dispatching a division of the Turkish fleet to the Black Sea, and when at a later council of war, the danger was pointed out, to which that squadron would be exposed in the event of the Russian fleet or a

portion of it leaving Sebastopol, an attempt was made to allay this untimely apprehension, by asserting that the Russians would not venture out to sea in the face of the united naval force. On receiving the terrible tidings, all the admirals did was to send out a French and an English steamer to ascertain the state of things before Sinope, and to bring back any of the wounded they might find there.*

Shortly after this sanguinary action fresh proposals for peace were forwarded by the great powers to Constantinople, comprising the following four points:—

1. The evacuation of the Principalities by the Russians in the shortest possible time.

2. Revision of the ancient treaties between Russia and Turkey.

3. A definitive settlement of the quarrel relative to the holy places.

4. A declaration of the Porte that she would negotiate on these terms under the guarantee of the four powers, and, during the conferences, consent to an armistice.

* On the return of the two steamers corroborating the report of the catastrophe, the French ambassador declared himself willing to order his fleet to follow the English into the Black Sea, provided the latter would lead the way to chastise the Russians. The English ambassador gave a similar declaration, but as neither would take precedence in issuing the requisite orders everything was left in *statu quo*; that is to say, the allied fleets remained comfortably riding at anchor in Besica Bay.

Owing to the great depression then prevailing at Constantinople, which was still farther increased by the news of the reiterated defeats of the Turks in Asia, diplomacy had an easy game to play with the Porte. The attention of the latter was called to her reverses at sea and land, as an evidence of her inability to cope single-handed with Russia; and she was told that the only course left to her was to accept the collective note of the mediating powers. The Turkish ministry, weak in itself, and still more weakened and intimidated by treachery, intrigues and menaces, at length yielded and accepted the terms of peace, laying them forthwith before the Sultan, who lost no time in giving his consent thereto.

Here the following question naturally suggests itself: What would have been the consequences had Russia, more clear-sighted and less confident in the forbearance of the western governments, acceded to these propositions and concluded peace? Her pressure upon Turkey would doubtless have increased to an intolerable degree, and her supremacy thus been established for all future ages, while the latter, having sacrificed the small residue of her self-reliance, would have been hurried to a speedy and inevitable dissolution.

Fortunately for Turkey, and perhaps for Europe itself, the peace-makers reckoned without their

host. On the tidings of the catastrophe at Sinope, a cry of indignation resounded from the Danube to the Thames, and the people of France and England, weary of the constant subserviency of their governments, unanimously demanded a change in their policy, and an open and honest intervention in favour of Turkey. Diplomacy was this time discomfitèd. The commanders of the fleets in the Bosphorus received orders to proceed to the Black Sea, and to announce to the Russian admirals, that they would compel every Russian vessel encountered in the open sea to put back into port, and that any attack upon Turkey and her fleet would be stoutly resisted. It was to no purpose that the ambassadors of Austria and Prussia protested against the execution of these measures; they were not listened to, and by the beginning of January 1854, the domination of the Czar in the Pontus was at an end.

Such was the first official act of open rupture between Russia and the western powers. In consequence thereof, the Russian ambassadors left Paris and London, and those of France and England at Petersburg received their passports.

But all these warlike demonstrations had little or no effect upon operations on the Danube during the winter. The heavy rains having rendered the communications impracticable, the movements of

large bodies of troops became almost impossible. The tacit suspension of hostilities which now ensued was not lost by either of the belligerents; the Russians calling in reinforcements, and the Turks endeavouring to train their raw soldiers, and inure them to the hardships of war. The only encounter of any importance in the course of the winter took place at Citate, in the vicinity of Kalâfat. The Turkish troops here displayed as great valour as their leaders an utter incapacity to command, and they had alone to thank the still greater incapacity of the Russians, for enabling them to make good their retreat to Kalafat, instead of having to surrender one and all to a superior enemy.

Notwithstanding its momentary discomfiture, diplomacy was not idle at Constantinople in getting up new intrigues and making constant efforts to re-establish peace. The leaders of the war party, who enjoyed the greatest popularity in Turkey. namely, Mustapha Pasha, the grand vizier; Mehemet Ali Pasha, the minister at war; the Sheik-ul-Islam and a number of others, were dismissed or banished, and their places filled with the hirelings of Reshid Pasha. The latter, having thus got the power exclusively into their own hands, became easy dupes to diplomacy.

IV.—DECLARATION OF WAR BY FRANCE AND ENGLAND AGAINST RUSSIA. WARLIKE EVENTS ON THE DANUBE IN THE SPRING OF 1854.

The last attempts at peace were made in the month of February and March. Napoleon even went so far as to write an autograph letter to the Czar, wherein he made new proposals for a reconciliation; but to no purpose. The ways and means towards a peaceful settlement having thus been exhausted, and, after the *ultimatissimum* of France and England had likewise been rejected by Russia, a declaration of war ensued, and the necessary preparations made for the commencement of simultaneous operations in the East and the Baltic. Austria and Prussia were invited to join the western alliance; they, however, preferred remaining neutral. To the powers of the second and third rank the choice was left free.

The Czar's reply to the declaration of France and England was an order to Gortschakoff to cross the Danube, and to attack the Turks in Bulgaria. The Russian general staff had as early as February commenced reconnoitring the banks of the Danube, and by a timely occupation and fortification of its islets, preparing the points of passage. It was now evident that they would in spite of the

menaces of the Allies attempt to cross the river as soon as they had concentrated a sufficient force.

Under these circumstances Omer Pasha's best plan would have been to have kept together the greatest portion of his army upon the most important point of the theatre of war, namely, between Shumla, Varna, and Rustschuk. A detached corps of 20,000 men, leaning upon Kalafat and Widdin, and a second of 10,000 placed between Nicopolis and Sistow, would have sufficed to ward off a diversion of the Russians upon the road to Sophia. The right wing would have been most effectively posted along the Trajan's-wall—already in a state of defence—with the vanguard in advance at Babadagh; not for the sake of occupying the line of the Lower Danube, but merely for observing the enemy. In such a position the Turkish army would not have been exposed to any check, and at a moment's notice might have covered the passes of the Balkan, and, if advisable, taken the offensive. But instead of this we find Omer Pasha, usually so clear-sighted, scattering his troops between Kalafat and the efflux of the Danube, in such a manner as to render their speedy concentration for an offensive movement against the advancing enemy quite impracticable; thereby facilitating the Russians in

rolling up his right wing and thus victoriously opening the campaign.*

The Russian army in the Principalities and Bessarabia, after having been reinforced by the third and part of the fifth army corps, mustered in the beginning of the spring campaign 120,000 men. Having, by sham manœuvres on different points, divided the attention of the Turks, Prince Gortschakoff began the campaign by sending a small detachment across the Danube into the Dobrudja, near Hirshova, which was quickly followed by other columns near Matschin, Isaaktscha, and Tultscha.

After the rejection of the last proposals for peace, which left no doubt as to the continuation of the war on the Danube, the possession of the Dobrudja became an absolute necessity for the Russians. As long as Wallachia was held as a mere pledge against the Turks, who till then

* The Turkish army occupied, in February 1854, the following positions: *Shumla:* 14 battalions, 6 squadrons, 4 batteries. *Varna:* 5 battalions, 2 batteries. *Paravadi:* 1 battalion, 6 squadrons, 1 battery. *Jenibazar:* 3 battalions. *Dzuma:* 6 battalions, 6 squadrons, 1 battery. *Rasgrad:* 3 battalions. *Bourgas:* 3 battalions. *Tirnova:* 6 battalions, 2 batteries. *Lochva:* 2 battalions. *Tultscha:* 3 battalions. *Isaaktscha:* 3 battalions. *Hatjin:* 4 battalions. *Hirshova:* 2 battalions. *Karasu:* 3 battalions, 6 squadrons, 5 batteries. *Babadagh:* 4 battalions. *Doasköi:* 3 battalions. *Silistria:* 8 battalions, 6 squadrons, 4 batteries. From *Widdin* to *Sistow* along the Danube: 9 battalions. *Kalafat:* 17 battalions, 18 squadrons, 7 batteries; and finally, *Sophia, Nizza* and vicinity: 19 battalions. What a singular position!

were supposed to be weak and impotent, as long as the struggle consisted only of more or less sanguinary skirmishes between the outposts, strategical considerations might be easily overlooked, and the Russians remain in a position where neither the communications nor the eventual retreat of their army had been duly cared for. When, however, affairs took a warlike turn, the safety of operations became of paramount importance. The Turks in the possession of the Dobrudja might, by way of Galatz and Braila, continually menace the main communication of the Russians, who at this juncture were compelled to place strong detachments along the whole line from Kalarash, opposite Silistria, down to the mouths of the Danube. The evil could only be surmounted by the conquest of this peninsula as far as the wall of Trajan; whereby the Russian position became considerably shortened, their left flank covered, and their farther advance upon the Balkan rendered possible.

The passage across the Danube, near Hirshova, was effected on the 20th, and those at Galatz, Braila and Ismail, on the 23rd of March. That column only which crossed from Ismail, above Tultscha, encountered serious resistance. Here the Turks defended their post with considerable bravery, while on all other points they fell back in disorder.

On the following day the Russians attacked the towns of Matschin, Isaaktscha, Tultscha and Hirshova, all badly fortified and still worse defended. They surrendered after a short cannonade, the garrisons having been made prisoners, and led away to Bessarabia. Mustapha Pasha, who commanded in the Dobrudja, rallied his dispersed and defeated troops in Babadagh, and fell back towards the Trajan's-wall. On the 2nd of April the Russians, now increased to 56 battalions, 36 squadrons, and 160 guns, in all 60,000 men, took up a position between Babadagh and Hirshova, from whence they pushed forward their vanguard as far as Tschernawoda. Their Danube flotilla had likewise been concentrated at Hirshova, where a bridge of boats, captured at Matschin, was thrown across the river.

About this time three Russian divisions were concentrated at Kalarash, and all preparations made both for an energetic attack upon Silistria and for the support of the army in its advance from the Dobrudja.

The rear-guard of the Turks was compelled to abandon Tschernawoda on the 5th of April, and Mustapha Pasha, on seeing his flank menaced, likewise gave up Karasu and the line of the Trajan's-wall, continuing his retreat to Basardjik. Those places were immediately occupied by

Russian detachments, and by the middle of April patrols of Cossacks scoured the country as far as Basardjik.

On the news of the Russians having forced a passage across the Danube, Omer Pasha removed his head quarters from Rustschuk to Shumla, and issued the dispositions for the concentration of the necessary forces to cover this important point as well as those of Paravadi and Varna, which together formed his second line of defence. The protection of the Danube he entrusted to the fortresses along that river.

The victorious advance of the Russians produced a paralysing effect at Constantinople. Everyone was so fully prepared for an easy victory, that the unfavourable result of the first encounter on a large scale, filled all with the most serious apprehensions, which the tardy arrival of the allied troops at Gallipoli, and the unsettled state of the realm, did not tend to diminish. The insurrection of the Greek population daily gained ground; there was not a Greek town or village either in Greece or Turkey, where the youth did not prepare for the holy war, and where collections of money or materials of war were not made for the support of the combatants. In Albania the excitement visibly increased, and the Bulgarians, after the successes the Russian arms had obtained, began to lend a

willing ear to the indefatigable emissaries of that power; while in Bosnia and Montenegro, Austria could at any moment kindle an insurrection, and thus obtain a plausible pretext for the much desired occupation of those provinces. Finally, if we bear in mind, that the treaty which Turkey had concluded with the western powers was rather of an oppressive character than otherwise, it is not astonishing, that in face of such disheartening facts, the Turks took alarm.

At this critical juncture the Wallachians again made an offer to insurrectionise their land in the rear of the Russians. Such a rising, assisted by the Turkish corps in Lesser Wallachia, would, beyond doubt, have been of paramount advantage to the defences of the Danube. But diplomacy again counterbalanced the advice of energetic men, by its subserviency towards Austria, who denounced such a movement as revolutionary and highly detrimental to the conservative interests of Europe. The offer was, therefore, not only rejected but the infatuation carried so far as to order the Wallachian militia who had deserted from the Russians to the Turkish camp, to be disarmed and sent back to their homes, which was tantamount to a death-warrant, for on returning to their villages they generally fell victims to Russian court-martials.

It has been shown on a former occasion what

return Russia made to her adversaries for their compliance. As war became a necessity, Russia went a step farther in her contempt of the law of nations, by levying recruits in the Principalities and organising a Greco-Sclavonian legion. Thus establishing the fact of how little she feared her acts assuming a strong revolutionary character, when her own interests could thereby be promoted.

V.—RUSSIAN OPERATIONS.

Towards the middle of April, Prince Paskiewitsch arrived on the theatre of war and took the direction of operations into his own hands. After the occupation of the Wall of Trajan he was at liberty to continue the offensive against the Turkish army. For this purpose he had eight army divisions at his disposal, not including the reserves on the Pruth and Dniester. Two divisions might, in a proper position, have kept the left wing of the Turks at bay; two more would have sufficed to observe Rustschuk and Silistria, as well as to guard the communications over the Danube. The rest, namely four divisions, together with the cavalry, about 70,000 strong, would still have remained to strike a decisive blow against the main army of Omer Pasha. As we already know, the Turkish right wing had been entirely routed, and judging

from its disorderly retreat, well-nigh demoralised, and Omer Pasha, by dint of the greatest exertions, could scarcely concentrate some thirty battalions in Shumla. All the forces, therefore, which the Prince Paskiewitsch had to encounter between the Danube and the line of Varna-Shumla did not exceed 40,000 men. Why did he not make the best of such an advantage, and attempt to drive the Turks over the Balkan before the arrival of the Allies? Why not have isolated their left wing, caused an insurrection in Bulgaria, and prevailed on the population to join the so-called crusade against the Crescent?

The motives that probably prevented the Prince from hazarding so rapid an advance were as follows:—

1. The irresolute policy of his own government which, suddenly baffled in its plans, was still undecided as to future proceedings, which of course created a wavering in the military operations.

2. Want of correct information in regard to the state of the Turkish army, and particularly an over estimation of the forces at Shumla.

3. The dubious attitude of Austria, which made it difficult to leave an ill-protected basis of operations too far behind, without the prospect of a certain victory.

4. The arrival of the Allied troops at the Darda-

nelles, and the vague information as to their strength and destination in Russian head-quarters.

The dispositions made by Paskiewitsch after his assuming the chief command, and the near object which he had marked out for his operations, were the natural consequences of the foregoing considerations, and it sounded strange, when at that very time the Russophile journals in Germany stated that there was a possibility of the Russian Marshal's speedy and victorious march up to the gates of Constantinople.*

The first act of Paskiewitsch was to recall the corps of Liprandi from Lesser Wallachia, where its presence was no longer of any moment, as Austria, on grounds best known to herself, had opposed the Serbian rising. The position of the Russians thereby became more concentrated and deep; and they could with greater facility take the offensive or remain on the defensive without half their army —as was the case till then—being exposed and left to the mercy and good-will of Austria.

As affairs stood, the next plan of the Russians—in the event of their not choosing to remain inactive —was to attack the two fortresses of Rassova and Silistria, and above all to gain possession of the

* In consequence of similar representations, Gallipoli was selected for the landing of the Allied army. See article in the *Moniteur*, April 11, 1855.

latter. This would have enabled them to convert the line of Silistria-Karasu into a strong basis for future undertakings. The Russian marshal accordingly issued orders for the siege of Silistria, and for that purpose selected the forces concentrated at Kalarash as well as the corps which, under Lüders, was advancing from the Dobrudja. On the 15th, Lüders proceeded to Kütschük-Kainardji; taking up, the following day, a position east of the fortress, and in the night of the 17th the siege operations were commenced by the opening of the first parallel. Chrulew's division was thrown upon the right bank, to reinforce Lüders, and during the subsequent days the siege works against the external defences of the fortress and chiefly against Arab Tabia continued without interruption. Another division, which crossed the Danube at Tortukan, established itself on the western side of Silistria, which was now invested, save to the south, where the garrison kept up an uninterrupted communication with Shumla and the Turkish detachments posted upon the road thither.

The progress, as well as the failure, of the siege, are well known. The latter is mainly attributable to the incomplete investment of the place, and the precipitation with which the attack had been directed. Had the garrison been deprived of its moral support, by being entirely isolated, and the

siege-works carried on more methodically and with greater tact, there is no doubt that the fortress would have succumbed in spite of its heroic resistance. Could the Russians but have got possession of the weak and defectively constructed external works,* the fortress must have given way to a serious assault, from the fact of its being commanded by those works, as well as from the surrounding heights.

VI.—RAISING THE SIEGE OF SILISTRIA. EVACUATION OF THE PRINCIPALITIES BY RUSSIA; THEIR OCCUPATION BY AUSTRIA.

When the siege-works and the mines had been carried far enough to hold out the hope of a speedy and successful assault against Arab Tabia, the principal outer work, an order suddenly came on the 21st of June to raise the siege, to re-cross the river with the train and troops, and to concentrate behind the Argish river.

What was the reason for this precipitate retreat of the Russians? As far, at least, as probable sacrifices were concerned, they could not have weighed heavily in the balance of considerations; neither could the Russians have been influenced —as the Vienna journals would assert—by the

* The external works of Silistria were only constructed at the outbreak of the war, and consisted of extremely weak entrenchments.

menacing attitude of Austria, and the concentration of troops on her borders; for, by the middle of June, the Austrian forces were so inconsiderable in the border provinces, in Transylvania and the Banat, that the former, for a length of time, had nothing to fear on that score. The increase of the Turkish army at Shumla, where strong reinforcements were daily pouring in, and the arrival of the Allies at Varna, could alone have excited serious misgivings in Russian head-quarters, where no exact idea existed as to the strength of the relieving army; still less was Paskiewitsch led to presume that the Allies would have to halt at Varna for want of the means of transport,* and leave the Turks to march on unsupported.

At this juncture, it would have been too hazardous to continue the siege, and, with the Danube in their rear, await the attack of a superior enemy, while, at the same time, the Turkish left wing was likewise preparing for active co-operation with Omer Pasha. Against such odds, the prospect of taking Silistria bore no fair proportion; when, therefore, General Schilder's project for an accelerated attack did not lead to a speedy result, it was thought advisable to abandon the enterprise, and

* Sagacious critics even lay great stress upon this point, for the simple object of attributing greater importance to the warlike demonstration of Austria. Paskiewitsch certainly did not dream of such negligence on the part of the Allied army, as want of transports, etc.

to take up a defensive position. To this step Russian diplomacy owes the advantage of having appeared to yield to the representations of Austria and Prussia, as well as of evincing its own inclination for peace.

Meanwhile, the Turkish corps on the extreme left, probably strengthened by reserves from Sophia, and by the garrisons of Nicopolis and Sistow, advanced to the Aluta river; and, on the farther retreat of the Russians, crossed that river, establishing the communication with the main army by way of Giurgievo.

Once in the fertile provinces on the left bank of the Danube, and amidst a population ready at a moment's notice to rise in arms against the invaders, the Turks who, together with a part of the auxiliary army of the Allies, now mustered at least 120,000 men, might have taken up a position, from whence, if not in this, at any rate early in the following year, they could have commenced offensive operations against the Russians in Bessabaria. But the interference of Austria and the wonderful sagacity of diplomacy again damped the warlike ardour of the "sick man."

Scarcely had the Russians began a retreat from Wallachia—which they did, as they themselves later allowed, for strategical reasons, and by no means from fear of Austrian intervention,

—than Austria came forward to insist upon a separate treaty between herself and Turkey, in virtue of which she was to have the right of the exclusive occupation of the Principalities. By the prudent mediation of diplomacy, the treaty was concluded, and the first consequence thereof was that that power became an insurmountable barrier to the farther advance of the Turks, who soon afterwards were compelled to recross the Danube.

Austria had gained her point. She now forced the Allies likewise to discontinue the war on the Danube, and look out for another field of action, somewhat more distant from her own borders. On the other hand the Russians, protected in their flank, had now only to defend a short line in front, namely, the Danube, from the conflux of the Pruth to the sea, and were thus enabled to throw considerable forces upon every point likely to be threatened by the Allies.

With the Convention of the 14th of June—the acceptance of which had been forced upon Turkey —diplomacy crowned her operations in this the first period of the war.

CHAPTER II.

THE WAR IN ASIA.

I.—EXTENSION OF RUSSIAN POWER IN ASIA.

As the aim of Russian policy in Europe—from the time of Peter the Great—consisted in an extension of power and territory, accomplished by a slow, though steady advance, westwards upon Germany and Central Europe, and southwards upon Constantinople, the acme of its ambition; in a like manner we see Russia spreading and establishing her influence and rule in Asia over far distant countries, whose extent is great, and whose importance daily becomes more patent.

Soon after their deliverance from the yoke of the Tartars, in the sixteenth century, the Russians appeared as conquerors on the shores of the Caspian Sea, by capturing Astrachan, and subjugating the Tartars of the vicinity; which made their name for the first time known to the tribes of the Caucasus. But their progress, notwithstanding the ties of relationship connecting the princes of Moskau and

those of Georgia, was then but slow and unimportant. Besides intestine wars, their attention was turned more to the west, from whence at times their very existence was menaced, alternately by the Poles and the Teutonic Knights. The plan for extending the Russian rule along the shores of the Caspian Sea, and from thence farther over the Caucasus, was again taken up by Peter the Great. He foresaw at a glance the importance of that inland sea, into which the mightiest channel of communication in Russia—the river Wolga—discharges its waters. The possession of this sea opened to that power both the trade with Central Asia and the ancient commercial road to India, which was already known both to the Greeks and Romans. Though the first expedition to Chiwa failed, the second, consisting of 30,000 men, and led by Peter himself along the western coast of the Caspian Sea, by way of Derbend, met with the most brilliant success. In less than a year he subdued the whole of the coast from Terek to Astrabad, and in the ensuing treaties of peace of 1723 and 1724, his right of possession over the conquered territory was acknowledged, and the landmark of the three empires, Russia, Persia, and Turkey, laid at the conflux of the rivers Araxes and Koor. But the domination of Russia over her new acquisition was of short duration. The cost of the occupation, not

less than the hostility of the highland tribes, together with the mortality amongst the Russian troops occasioned by the unhealthy climate, induced Peter to give up the expensive conquest, and to content himself with garrisoning some of the sea-ports. Even these were abandoned in the years 1732 and 1733, and the convention concluded with Shah Nadir fixed the Terek as the limit of Russia.

The same ill success attended her early attempts to gain a firm footing on the Kuban and the eastern coast of the Black Sea. The determined resistance which the mountaineers opposed to the invaders, frustrated all the Muscovite schemes in that direction. Sheik Mansur was the first of the chieftains who summoned the true believers to the holy war against Russia. The echo of that call is not yet extinguished, and will doubtless resound from those mighty bulwarks until the last of its combatants has sealed his fidelity to freedom and national independence with his life. *In majorem Russiæ gloriam!*

In the second moiety of the eighteenth century, about the time when the plea for the partition of Poland was concocting at St. Petersburg, the troubled state of the Caucasian countries afforded the empress Catherine the plausible pretext for an intervention there, for the express purpose, as she solemnly proclaimed, of taking the menaced

Christian inhabitants under her safe protection. Heraclius, King of Georgia, having been defeated in a war against Persia and the mountaineers, implored the aid of the empress. His request was eagerly granted, and a Russian corps dispatched to his assistance, which, having traversed the Kabarda and forced the pass of Dariel, descended from the southern slopes of the Caucasus, joined the Georgians, and in the following war with Turkey occupied several points on the shores of the Euxine. The peace of Kütschük-Kainardji gave Russia for the first time the right of protection over the Christian population of the Caucasus, and ten years afterwards the kings and princes of Georgia were already compelled to renounce their independence by accepting the confirmation of their dignity from the hands of the Czar. This occurred simultaneously with the incorporation of the Crimea.

In 1784, the Khan of Darkaw tendered his submission, and in 1793, the Khans of Derbend and Baku, on the shore of the Caspian Sea, followed his example. The peace of Jassy towards the close of the eighteenth century confirmed the Russians in the possession of several districts on the Kuban, and deprived the Turks for ever of their sovereignty over the Christian princes of Georgia. In 1796, a Russian corps seized upon the Khanates of Shaki, Shirwan, and Karabad in the Lower Koor valley,

which until then were under the nominal rule of Persia, and thus the foundation of Russian power was also laid there. Finally a fresh war between Georgia and the mountaineers afforded Russia an opportunity of establishing herself permanently in Trans-Caucasia. King George XIII., of Georgia, having called in the Russians, and with their aid defeated the mountaineers, on the 28th of December, 1800, bequeathed in his and his heir's name his throne and land to the Czar. Alexander, on his accession to the throne, announced to his Georgian subjects, that he took possession of their country, as an inheritance of their late sovereign, with the sole intention of putting an end to their sufferings and introducing a regular administration, and by no means for the sake of extending his empire, which was already sufficiently large.

But Russia was not long peacefully to enjoy the dominion over her recent acquisitions. A confederacy of princes and chiefs, as well as two mighty emperors in the south, united their forces to stay the onward course of the powerful aggressor. The struggle with Persia, Turkey, and the mountaineers, lasted throughout the first ten years of the nineteenth century, until the peace of Bucharest in 1812, and that of Gulistan, in 1813, with Persia, put an end to the protracted contest, and settled the new confines with greater exactness. Those treaties sub-

jected to Russia all the countries lying between the Caucasus and the Allagös mountains, and extended her limits in the east, towards Persia, to the Araxes, and in the west, towards Turkey, to the Akista mountains.

Another and an equally severe contest for the possession of these provinces sprung up with Persia and Turkey in 1827 to 1829; the issue of which was as advantageous for Russia as the preceding ones. By the subsequent treaty of peace, her boundaries in those regions were fixed as they are to this day. Here again she gained from Persia the Khanate of Jalish, and the provinces of Erivan and Nakichewan in Armenia; while the Porte ceded to her Anapa, Poti, the Pashalic of Akiska, formerly a Georgian province, and all her claims upon the eastern shores of the Euxine.

Since that period Russia has never again been disturbed in the possession of her Caucasian dependencies, save by her own aggressive warfare against the mountaineers, who still defend their liberties as bravely and successfully as they have done during the last thirty years. The enormous sacrifices Russia made, and is still making, to gain a firm footing south of the Caucasus, is the best proof of the importance she attaches to the subjugation of those countries. The Caucasus forms the basis to her farther advance upon Central Asia;

and Teflis, which now rises so rapidly, is the watch-tower from whence she stretches her arms towards Armenia and Persia, and at the same time casts longing eyes on the road to India.

That Russian conquest in Central Asia will not cease with the annexation of Trans-Caucasia, and that the latter will serve as a starting point for a farther advance, is evident from the regret expressed at St. Petersburg shortly before the conclusion of the last peace with Turkey, when it was said that the limits of the empire in Asia ought, for the sake of a better rounding up, to have been extended to the Saganlüg, which would have made Russia master of Erzeroum and of Turkish Armenia. It is scarcely requisite to state that in the latter case Persia would have become a complete dependency of Russia. The next object of Russian aggression in Asia will doubtlessly be Turkish Armenia, in which enterprise she will be supported by two millions of its Christian inhabitants, whose consciences are completely in the keeping of Katolikos, their primate, at present residing upon Russian soil.

II.—OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN TURKEY AND RUSSIA. STRENGTH OF THEIR ARMIES.

Great though the danger may be which threatens Turkey from the Danube, yet her position in Asia

is not a whit the less perilous and vulnerable; and nothing will avert the destruction already lowering over her richest provinces, save the repulse of the Russians across the Caucasus. A serious consideration of these facts was urged upon the Porte from various quarters at the beginning of this war, and at the same time it was represented to her that, although her means of defence in other parts of her empire were limited, she possessed in her Asiatic provinces the principal elements for a successful attack upon Russia.

In Asia most of the neighbouring races were united to her by the ties of descent, language and religion, and above all, by a common hatred to their northern foe; that she would consequently find there her natural and most faithful allies. Therefore, while remaining on the defensive along the Danube, until the Western Powers appeared at the seat of war, she should without loss of time, and with all possible energy, commence offensive operations in Asia. Unprepared and scattered as the Russians were over the Caucasus in their numerous forts, they could not at that time long have withstood both the shock of a rapidly advancing army from one side, and the furious assaults of the mountaineers from an opposite direction against Teflis. They must have succumbed long before their reinforcements could come up to their assistance.

Their position was rendered still more critical by the paucity and insecurity of their communications with the other parts of Russia, and in the event of the military roads falling into the power of the highland tribes, which, from their daring courage, was by no means improbable, then the death-knell would peal to her dominion in Trans-Caucasia.

But to insure the success of so extensive and decisive an enterprise, the following three requisites were indispensable:—

1. The rising of the Georgians, Tartars, and the various races in the Caucasus.

2. The utmost efforts on the part of Turkey, as well as an honest and judicious policy.

3. An alliance with Persia.

In the event of the Western Powers assisting the Turks in their work of deliverance, the more certain their victory would be.

The Turkish forces in Asia, in virtue of the new army regulations, were to consist of four army corps. Of this number, only two were completely organised at the outbreak of the war, namely, the corps of the Guards, and that of Anatolia. The corps of Arabistan was raised but to half of its strength, and that of Irak scarcely existed except on paper, being entirely absorbed in the garrison of Bagdad, and in those of the subjected Arab districts. As the greatest part of the Guards was

either employed as a reinforcement for the army on the Danube or to garrison Constantinople, the disposable army ready to take the field on the Russian frontiers in Asia, which in summer 1853 included solely the corps of Anatolia and Arabistan, mustered a regular force of 36,000 foot, 4,000 horse and 100 guns, to which were added in the course of the autumn, 24,000 irregulars, the so-called Bashi-Bazouks. Besides these a fresh levy was ordered in Anatolia and Syria, and irregulars from all parts of the empire continued to pour into the camps.

These forces were distributed in unequal proportions on three different points; namely, two-thirds before Kars, the larger half of the third part at Batoum, and the rest in the vicinity of Bayazid. Abdi Pasha, Mushir of Anatolia, commanded the corps before Kars: that at Batoum was led by Selim Pasha, formerly commander of the Guards at Constantinople, and a second Selim Pasha stood at the head of the corps at Bayazid.

The Russians who, at the commencement of the war, formed the army of occupation in the Caucasian provinces, consisted of the so-called isolated Caucasian army corps, and amounted to 80,000 men. These forces were distributed on both sides of the mountains, and had to defend the northern line, from the Black to the Caspian Sea, the fortresses of Sudjuk Kale, and Anapa, together with

the ports of the Crimea, and the great military road over the mountains from Wladikawkas to Teflis. To the south they had to guard the line of Daghestan, the fortresses and forts in the interior, and the border places towards Turkey. This army having besides a corps of observation in the field, to keep Shamyl at bay, the whole force, which could be opposed to the advance of the Turks along the line from the Euxine to Mount Ararat, mustered at the utmost 25,000 men. Of this body of troops 10,000 were detached in the direction of Gumri, there, supported by that fortress, to protect the road to Teflis against the main army of the Turks. General Andrichoff, at the head of several thousand men, took up a position in the Upper Koor valley. Another small corps was concentrated in Guriel, upon the road to Kutais, and a fourth guarded the road from Erivan to Bayazid, in Russian Armenia; the rest having been left as a disposable reserve in the interior.

III.—THE EVENTS ON THE THEATRE OF WAR NEAR KARS.

We will now turn to the operations of the Turks, and begin with the theatre of war near Kars. Owing to the lateness of the season, as well as the sudden setting in of winter, an immediate and decisive campaign in that elevated part of the

country was for the year 1853 quite out of the question. The principal care of the Turkish Commander-in-chief should therefore have been to guard his army against partial losses, and to obtain a firm basis for subsequent operations. The first he might have effected by maintaining a strict defensive with regard to the Russian main army opposite Kars; and the second by striking a well planned and rapid blow against Erivan in Russian Armenia. A slight inspection of the map shows that a Turkish army on its advance from Gumri upon Teflis, if not already in possession of that province, would be exposed both in flank and rear. Its occupation was, therefore, the first requisite before a grand attack upon Teflis could be thought of. This line of action, moreover, offered the signal advantage of considerably diminishing the pressure of Russia upon Persia, and of hastening the wavering court of Teheran to join the alliance against the common enemy. In that case the following year might have witnessed the forces of Persia and Turkey crossing the Allagös mountains, and gaining the road to Teflis, without being compelled to lay siege to the Russian border fortresses. There was still another advantage to be obtained from the occupation of Russian Armenia; that is the proximity to the Tartars of the Lower Koor, who form the chief part of the population there, and are

ready at any moment to take up arms against their hated Russian masters. Although aware of the former, the difficulties of a decisive campaign in the course of the year, yet Abdi Pasha did not possess sufficient penetration to see the necessity and the ulterior consequences of the second, viz., of an energetic blow against Erivan. In his opinion circumstances only admitted of his leaving a strong corps of observation near Kars, and with the rest of the army going into winter quarters at Erzeroum, there quietly to await the arrival of spring. He reported to this effect to his government, who, however, not satisfied with this peaceable view of his position, sent strict orders to him forthwith to take the field and to attack the Russians: the how was left entirely to his discretion.

Previous to the execution of this order, Mustapha Zarif Pasha, governor of the province of Erzeroum, at the head of a hastily collected corps of several thousand Bashi-Bazouks, made an inroad from Ardahan into the district of Akiska, formerly a Turkish dependency. The small Russian detachment retired before the impetuous advance of the Bashi-Bazouks into the fortress of Akiska, whose commander, in a letter to Prince Woronzoff, which was intercepted by the Turks, expressed his apprehension that in the event of the fortress being invested, he would, from want of

provisions, be unable to hold out longer than a week or ten days. Hereupon, a division under Ali Pasha was dispatched to Akiska, both to assist Zarif Mustapha Pasha in investing that place, and eventually to offer battle to a relieving army. With the main army Abdi Pasha executed an offensive movement against Gumri, by crossing the border river Arpa-Tchai and establishing his camp upon Russian ground, near the village of Baindir; thus acting the very contrary to what he ought to have done. For instead of remaining on the defensive as far as Gumri was concerned, Abdi Pasha hazarded an attack upon it; leaving the Russians in Armenia and Erivan undisturbed, and not even taking the precautionary measure of ordering the corps of Bayazid to execute a diversion in that direction.

Meanwhile, a sortie of the garrison of Gumri having been repulsed, the small Russian corps of observation, which was posted in the vicinity of the fortress, considered it advisable to retreat upon Teflis. This was the only ray of success which ever smiled upon the arms of Abdi Pasha. His general staff was now at its wit's end. There was no siege train with which to commence operations against the fortress; neither were they provided with the means of transport for a farther advance upon Teflis. The winter, which set in with un-

usual severity, added to the difficulties; provisions also began to grow scarce in the camp; the Bashi-Bazouks, during their incessant scouring of the country, having partly appropriated and partly destroyed the supply in the neighbouring villages. Thus, after passing some weeks in utter inactivity, during which time Ali Pasha had been defeated by Andronikoff at Akiska and compelled to recross the frontier, Abdi Pasha determined to give up his position near Baindir, and to fall back upon Kars. The Russians having, meanwhile, completed their defences, as well as concentrated a sufficient body of troops for an offensive movement, followed the retreating Turks, overtook them mid-way between Gumri and Kars, and brought them to an engagement, which ended in a total rout of the latter. The victors, well contented with their success, did not pursue the fugitives, but again returned into winter quarters at Gumri and its vicinity. The Turks, utterly demoralised by their twofold defeat at Gedikler and Akiska, saved themselves behind their fortifications at Kars, where they passed the winter, stowed away like herrings in a barrel. Thus ended the first campaign against the Russians in Asia upon the line of Kars-Teflis.

In consequence of these disasters, Abdi Pasha was deposed, and his place filled by Achmet Pasha, a rough and ignorant Kurd, under whose command

the sufferings of the Turks at Kars began in right earnest. The army gradually dwindled down to 8000 men, and was approaching its total dissolution, when, at the eleventh hour, Achmet Pasha was recalled, and for his infamous conduct placed before a court-martial. His successor, Mustapha Zarif Pasha, although not possessed of great military abilities, had, nevertheless, the firmness to insist upon an honest administration, and a more regular victualling of the army than had been the case with his predecessors. In fact, under his command, the army was put upon a better footing, and, on being duly reinforced by fresh levies, had, in the summer of 1854, again attained the strength of the past year.

In proportion as the physical state of the army improved, its moral condition, at least with regard to the higher officers, grew worse and worse. Soon after the defeat at Gedikler, a number of European officers had been sent to Kars to undertake the reorganisation of the troops. Instead, however, of living together on amicable terms, and setting a good example to the men, they seemed to have no higher idea of their mission than the carrying on a constant war of intrigue against each other. Ferhat Pasha, the Hungarian General Stein, the most able amongst them, who from his influence with the Turks might have given a favourable turn

to the ensuing operations, was, in consequence of some calumny, recalled soon after his appointment. In this manner summer came, and the troops now on an effective footing, instead of being led against the Russians, were left inactive, owing to the discord amongst their commanders. To put an end to this state of things the Turkish government desired Omer Pasha to send an English and a French general to the army at Kars, to introduce something like order into the affairs of the general staff as well as in the direction of operations. Omer Pasha expressed his inability to comply with the wish, but at the same time advised that the mission should be entrusted to a foreign general, who at that moment was residing at Constantinople, and had already offered his services in vain to the Porte. This general, he wrote, gave sufficient proof of his military sagacity during the late war in Hungary, and is perfectly up to the task. But the Porte thought it wiser to decline his services, from a fear of giving offence to Austria, with whom a treaty of alliance touching the occupation of the Principalities was then pending.

Had the Allies at that time sent a couple of thousand French and English troops, led by an able general, to the aid of the Turks in Asia, they might easily have repaired the disasters of the

past year's campaign, as well as the neglects of the present one. For the Russians had as yet no sufficient force successfully to defend their Trans-Caucasian provinces against an energetic attack. No such step, however, being taken, it was easy to foresee the issue of the second campaign. Fortunately for the Turks two circumstances combined to give them a most unexpected respite, viz., the inactivity of their enemy, and the continued vacillation of Persia. When, at length, the Russians saw that their adversaries had no intention of coming forward, they decided in their turn to assume the offensive. Their main army, about 20,000 strong, advanced in June from Gumri upon Kars, and took up a position at Kuruk Dere, opposite the Turkish camp. Another corps, on the line of Erivan-Bayazid, under General Wrangel, forced the passes of the Ararat, defeated the Turkish corps that attempted to check its advance, and occupied Bayazid. After a short halt, this body of Russians took the direction of Toprak Kule, upon the road to Erzeroum, threatening the communications and line of retreat of the army of Kars. At this juncture the Turks resolved to attack the Russian position at Kuruk Dere on the 4th of August, but effected it in such an incongruous manner, that the fortune of the day, despite their numerical superiority, turned against them,

the Russians having made themselves masters of the battle-field. The Turks lost about 5,000 men in slain, wounded and prisoners; the Russians, according to their own official account, above 3,000 men, which proves that the failure of the attack was not to be attributed to the want of bravery on the part of the soldiers, but to the utter incapacity of their commanders. The heavy loss of the Russians on that day, and a simultaneous devastating irruption of Shamyl into the district of Teflis, prevented them from taking advantage of their victory; and after remaining awhile in their encampment they recrossed the frontier and retreated to Gumri. Similar reasons may have prevailed with General Wrangel, who likewise abandoned Bayazid and fell back upon Erivan. Since then there has been a total suspension of hostilities on both sides upon that point; both parties confining themselves to observing each other from a distance. At the commencement of the cold season they went into winter quarters; the Russians taking up theirs in the order of the preceding year, the bulk of their army being stationed between Gumri and Teflis, and their left flank corps at Erivan. The Turks sent their army to Erzeroum, and left a corps of observation, 10,000 strong, at Kars and Ardahan. Mustapha Zarif Pasha, Kurshid Pasha, and several other Pashas, were deposed after the

action at Kuruk Dere, and summoned to Constantinople. In a like manner most of the European officers were removed, and in the autumn, Wassif Pasha was named commander-in-chief of the Kars army, with colonel Williams as his adviser. What measures they will adopt to retrieve the many blunders of their predecessors future events will best prove.

IV.—OPERATIONS ON THE EASTERN SHORES OF THE BLACK SEA.

As I have already pointed out, the insurrection of the Georgians and the mountaineers in the Caucasus, is the main requisite to successful and extensive operations against Russia in Asia. The most favourable starting point for such an enterprise is Batoum, where in the autumn 1853 a Turkish army corps was concentrated, which during the winter attained the strength of 16,000 men with twenty-four guns. This corps was commanded by Selim Pasha; while Hassan Bey, a wealthy landed proprietor from the Turkish province of Tschuruk-su, a man of great energy and bravery but of most lawless habits, led the Bashi-Bazouks. Well acquainted with the country and secretly assisted by the Georgians, Hassan Bey surprised the Russian fort of St. Nicholas in the night of October 28, carried it by assault, and put the whole of the

garrison to the sword. The Russians, too weak to attempt the recapture of the fort, remained for a while inactive spectators on the borders, until—probably alarmed by the appearance of the Allied fleets—they retired into the interior towards Kutais, leaving only a detachment behind for the purpose of observing the Turks. In consequence, Selim Pasha pushed forward upon Russian ground to Osurgheti, three hours distant from the borders, and put himself in direct communication with the Georgians.

The Georgian or Grusian race spreads over the whole of the western Caucasian isthmus. The greatest part, professing the Christian faith, inhabit in the Koor and Rion Valleys, the so-called provinces of Georgia, Immeretia, Guria, Mingrelia, &c., previously independent states, but now forming the Russian governments of Kutais and Teflis. Those of the Georgians, however, dwelling upon Turkish soil, and some few races dispersed over the mountains, are followers of Islam. The number of the Christian Georgians amounts to nearly one million, with 60,000 to 80,000 men capable of bearing arms. The most efficacious means of insurrectionising those races against Russia would have been to rouse their national feeling by guaranteeing them the establishment of an independent Christian Georgia under the protectorate of the

Allied powers. It has already been mentioned in the beginning of this chapter that the Georgians submitted to the rule of their present masters from inability any longer to defend themselves against Persians, Turks, and the mountaineers, who threatened them with total extirpation; and if since that time their country has enjoyed any peace and security they have to thank the Russians for it. If, therefore, they were to hazard these boons in a desperate struggle, an equivalent must be offered them in the shape of freedom and national independence. Such an offer alone would have tallied with the assurance of the Allies, that the contest in the East was undertaken solely for the sake of civilisation and justice.

How has that promise been kept?

The tent of Selim Pasha was scarcely pitched upon Georgian ground, when Turkish detachments overran the country, kidnapping children and sending them to Batoum and Trebizond to the slave market. Even the commander of the corps did not consider it beneath his dignity to appropriate some of those wretched beings, probably for the sake of offering them as bribes in the metropolis.

After this exemplary conduct of the Turkish commander as well as of his troops, the Georgians were summoned to acknowledge the Ottoman rule,

and, as a proof of their submission, to wage a war for the Crescent against their oppressors. No great sagacity was required to foresee what echo such a summons would find in a population writhing under the late outrageous treatment from the hands of their so-called deliverers! Of all the inhabitants of distinction only one, Demetrius, presented himself at the head-quarters of the Turks, not, however, to accept the Kaftan, but to open the eyes of the Pasha as to the real state of affairs as well as to the true feelings of his compatriots.* Notwithstanding this warning, Selim Pasha insisted upon the people submitting unconditionally to his behest, in which he was duly confirmed by the instructions of his government. Meanwhile, what were the representatives of the Allies doing at Constantinople? Instead of interfering in behalf of the Georgians, they had only eyes and ears for the events on the Danube, and apparently left matters in Asia to take their own course, in order to have an opportunity for lowering the pride of the Turks, who might possibly be too much elated by their victorious advance across the Danube, and thus prove refractory at the very moment of being called upon to accede to an easy and speedy peace.

This was all very well, but how about the real

* Demetrius, it appears, had been charged with treachery by Selim Pasha, and though not convicted was nevertheless put to death.

object of the war? The preponderance of Russian power in Asia; her pressure upon Persia; the safety of the road to India?

The consequences of such culpable neglect on the part of the Allies, as well as the unpardonable conduct of the Turks, were soon felt on all sides. The Georgians rose in arms, not for, but against, the Turks, and with their wonted warlike ardour and gallantry formed the chief support of the Russian defence. Hassan Bey, the conqueror of St. Nicholas, having, during one of his inroads, come upon the Russian corps of observation, decided to surprise it. Selim Pasha, desirous of laurels, particularly when they were culled for him by others, gave his consent to the scheme. But the affair turned out a complete failure. The fray cost Hassan Bey, and more than 1500 of his Bashi-Bazouks, their lives; and many others were cut down in their flight by the exasperated Georgians. The tidings of the defeat of his zealous sub-commander induced Selim Pasha to fall back from Osurgheti upon Lackwa, where, on the 9th of June, he was attacked by the Russians, under the command of Andronikoff, and totally routed. After an action of scarcely three hours, his army turned back and fled, leaving guns, tents and baggage in the hands of the victors. The remnants of the defeated corps rallied at Batoum;

and, on the Russians showing no desire to cross the frontiers, returned to their former position between St. Nicholas and Tschuruk-su. Here they were strengthened by fresh reinforcements of men and guns; but to no purpose. Indifferent to glory as well as to their duty, they passed their days in sweet repose, and remained idly looking on at the Russians.

In the month of August, Selim Pasha was replaced by Mustapha Pasha, who, at the same time, was entrusted with the command of all the forces on the eastern coast of the Euxine. Had the Allies but landed a corps of a few thousand men there in the summer of 1854, and, conjointly with the Turks, advanced into the Rion valley, they might even then have gained the confidence of the Georgians by a loyal and straightforward policy. As this, however, was not the case, the Russians were left free to incite the hatred of the population against the invaders. In a like careless manner did the Allies deal with the favourable opportunity of gaining an ascendancy over the important races along the sea-board of Circassia and Abasia, as well as over those dwelling in the western mountains.

V.—THE CAUCASUS AND THE ALLIES.

All the efforts and sacrifices of Russia to subjugate the heroic races of the Caucasus have met with only partial and unsatisfactory results. Though the circle of their attack gradually draws closer and closer, and the defenders are driven farther and farther into the interior of their mountain fastnesses, yet their resistance and courage continue as determined as ever; and the smaller portion of them in the exposed valleys alone bend their proud necks beneath the Russian yoke. The rest are still free and independent, replying both to the promises and the assaults of their aggressors with bullet and yatagan. But whether oppressed or free, all races entertain a deadly and unconquerable hatred to everything that bears the name of Russian.

Those races, who, until now, have so successfully asserted their independence, are the Circassians, Abasians, and several minor tribes dwelling at the foot of the mountains along the western coast. Amongst them, the descendants of the Tartar khans from the Crimea sought and found a refuge, together with many Nogaic fugitives, who, particularly amongst the Circassians, contribute in a great measure to keep alive a spirit of

resistance.* There is, however, a lack of harmony in their way of carrying on the struggle, and for that reason extensive enterprises against the Russians are of rare occurrence.

South of Elbrus, on the Upper Ingur, the Swanians, a Georgian race, form a kind of republic: though not acknowledging Russian supremacy, still they live in peace with them.

The most formidable opposition to the incroachment of Russia is made in the eastern range of the Caucasus, where the genius of Shamyl has kept up, for a quarter of a century, an heroic and successful contest with the veteran armies of the Czar. The races who acknowledge him as their chief, are best known under the denomination of the Tschetschenzians and Lesghians, and their peculiar organisation and union into brotherhood is productive of that daring spirit, which, at intervals, like their hurricanes, suddenly sweeps down the steeps and ravines, breaking the iron belt with which their enemies endeavour to dam up its irresistible torrent.

The other tribes in the mountains have, in the course of time, either been entirely subdued by the Russians, or compelled to submission under their

* Under the collective name of Circassians are comprised all the races occupying the north-western range of the mountains. They are again subdivided into the Adigsians, Abasians, Abbasethians, and other minor tribes.

own chiefs, by paying a yearly tribute. To support these races in their struggle, to unite them into a confederacy, and to establish their political existence upon a firm basis, would have been a task worthy alike of the great and noble principle proclaimed by the Allies, and highly conducive to their own interests; the accomplishment of which would, at least, have contributed as much towards the security of Turkey as the intended razing of Sebastopol and the destruction of the Russian fleet.

The points, from whence the Allies might best have effected their union with the chiefs and taken the lead in the contest, are the districts on the Kuban, the Laba, and along the coast from Anapa to Sudjuk Kale, down to Mingrelia. The population of these provinces, according to Russian as well as other statistical records, amounts to 700,000 with 80-100,000 men capable of bearing arms.*

On the evacuation of all the fortified places by the Russians, excepting Anapa, Gelendjik and Sudjuk Kale, the Allies were left at full liberty to land a few thousand men, on a point best suited for the purpose of erecting one or more entrenched camps, and making them the focus of the rising of

* The seat of Shamyl's struggle in the Eastern Caucasus (Daghestan, Lesghistan, Tschetschna), with a population as strong, if not stronger, than that on the seaboard, is too distant for an immediate and active co-operation with the Allies; its isolation being rendered still more complete by the intervening subjugated tribes as well as by the Russian lines of fortifications.

the mountaineers. Whoever is acquainted with the poverty of the inhabitants, and their proportionate love of money, must acknowledge the fact that at the same cost, required for the maintenance of a single English division, 50,000 men might be raised there, and after a little drilling and discipline under European and Turkish officers, be employed with the greatest advantage in the mountain warfare. Such a force, augmented by 10,000 irregular cavalry under their own chiefs and Bēys, likewise paid and supported by a Division of the Allies, would have been in every respect competent to undertake a double operation; namely, the main army to lay siege to Anapa and Sudjuk Kale in the north, to gain a firm footing on the Kuban, and to menace the Russian communications with the Caucasus; while to the south a corps was to penetrate into the interior of the mountains, to compel the wavering tribes to join the alliance against the common enemy, and, united with them, to take the defile of Dariel, thus clearing a way for a union with Shamyl. The Russians in Trans-Caucasia would thus have lost their only road across the mountains and been restricted to one line of communication, and retreat by way of Derbend on the Caspian Sea, which, hedged in by a hostile Moslem population, bent upon rising at any moment, was one beset with

insecurity and danger. What a mighty diversion, for facilitating the operations of the Allies upon the European theatre of war, and relieving the hard-pressed and reiteratedly defeated Turks in Asia!

The Allies, however, seemed to entertain a different opinion. In the spring of 1854 they allowed the Russian steamers to ply at will upon the Black Sea, and to take on board the garrisons of the many forts, together with the accumulated materials of war, and to land them partly at Anapa and partly in Mingrelia. By way of justification the Allies pleaded that war had not yet been declared; but in that case could not the Turkish fleet have been employed to prevent their enemy from an undisturbed removal of a part of its army? It would have been an easy task, with the aid of the mountaineers, to have seized all those lost positions ere the Russians could even think of abandoning them, which would have cost them about 5,000 veterans, and a considerable quantity of materials of war. Such a blow in the beginning could not have failed to produce the most favourable impression upon the population of the Caucasus. But even at a later period the Allies contented themselves with sending a few steamers on a cruize along the Circassian coast, treating with civility the chiefs who came on board; giving them, however, such mystified accounts of their

warlike proceedings against Russia, as were utterly incomprehensible to those sons of nature, alike simple in mind and purpose.

The Turks, on their part, already looking upon their rule in the Caucasus as restored, appointed civil and military governors, and sent them with firmans, but without money, arms, or troops, to Sukum Kale, the then provisional seat of the Turkish government for the Caucasus.

Naib Effendi, the emissary of Shamyl, who exercises great authority over the Circassians and the other mountaineers along the western range, crossed to Sukum Kale, and from thence, accompanied by a large number of chieftains, went to Constantinople in order to concert with the Porte on the most efficacious measures for a common plan of operations against Russia, and to effect an alliance between Shamyl and the Turks. But all in vain! The government pursued the same course of policy towards the Moslem mountaineers as it had formerly done with the Christian Georgians, that is to say, insisting upon their submission to the authority of the Sultan as their lawful sovereign. Thus Naib and his companions left the metropolis in great discontent, and fully undeceived as to their sanguine expectation.

The only part of the Caucasus where the Turks succeeded in gaining any influence was in Abasia,

and even there their presence was fraught with the most cruel sufferings to the population. The Ottoman government having invested some dozen chiefs with the dignity of Pashas, promised a governorship to each separately, without, however, really appointing one of them. The seed of discord thus sown, grew up rapidly. The people became divided into as many factions as there were chiefs, and the consequence was, that instead of battling with the Russians, they kept up a murderous intestine war.

The Circassians, more prudent than their brethren in Abasia, have till now held aloof from the excellent administration of the Turkish Pashas, preferring to carry on a desultory warfare against the invaders, quite independently of their judicious Allies at Constantinople. Their position is now what it was previous to the war. They fight the Cossacks of the Black Sea and those of the Caucasian line, adversaries worthy of them by equal bravery, and only superior in open field by the use of guns. The Circassians defend hearth and home with perseverance and intrepidity; but as long as an invasion on a large scale is not organised, Russia need not be alarmed as to the fate of this portion of her border provinces.

All that has hitherto been said tends to show how little care the Allies, from the very beginning,

bestowed upon the warlike events in Asia, and particularly in the Caucasus; otherwise they could but have seen that the whole mountain range forms part of the southern theatre of war, and is to Russia in the south what Poland is to her in the west, viz., her most vulnerable part. The Allies ought to have been aware that an energetic offensive in the Caucasus, and the defeat of their enemy there, would have immensely promoted the success of their arms on the other scenes of action. It was possibly apprehended that the possession of those districts would bring but little direct advantage, and that even that little could not easily be turned to account; but, on the other hand, it was entirely forgotten what enormous Russian forces would thereby be destroyed, and that, by means of that acquisition, in the following year a Turco-Persian and Circassian army, numbering hundreds of thousands of combatants, might have been called into existence to deluge Russia as far as the Don and the Wolga. Neither was it taken into consideration that so tremendous an invasion would have shaken that empire to its very foundation, and have produced consequences of the highest and most beneficial importance to humanity. In a word, everything was disregarded and forgotten, and the conquest of Russia confined to preparations for a descent upon the Crimea.

CHAPTER III.

THE CAMPAIGN OF THE ALLIES.

I.—DECLARATION OF WAR BY THE ALLIES. THEIR FORCES. CHOICE OF THE POINT OF LANDING.

After a series of conferences, at which the Western powers displayed as much forbearance as Russia falsehood and sophistry, the former were at length compelled to declare war against the latter. The announcement of this event called forth an expression of unanimous satisfaction from the Parliaments of both countries. The respective communications stated that the war was to be a short and decisive one, and that France and England would do all in their power to afford to the whole of Europe every guarantee against the return of the complications which have so unhappily disturbed its repose.

Such a magnanimous declaration found a joyous echo in the hearts of the nations. The pressure of Russia upon Europe had already lasted far too long a period; she had been too long allowed to form a

barrier to civilisation, and a check to the freedom of thought and of action. It was high time to put a limit to her encroachments, and to reduce the balance of power to an equitable and natural basis.

Yet, at the very outset, it was but too manifest how futile were the just expectations aroused by that declaration. The forces destined to take the field were in the most crying disproportion to the end announced, and at the utmost equal to a holiday demonstration, but certainly not to carrying out so gigantic an undertaking. At first England proposed to send out only 10,000 men, and France twice that number; and when the folly of such a proceeding became patent, it was resolved to double the forces named on both sides.

Previous to the embarkation of the troops, General Burgoyne and Colonel Ardant were sent out on the part of England and France to Constantinople, and from thence, by way of Varna, to the Danube, for the purpose of acquiring an accurate knowledge of the state of the Turkish army, and to report to their respective governments as to their efficiency and the most fitting point for landing the army of expedition on Turkish soil. It appears that both these officers, accustomed only to the military displays in Hyde Park and the Champs de Mars, were not particularly edified by the exterior of the

Turkish army; for in their despatches they expressed their apprehension that the Russians would find it an easy task to force the position of the Turks, and to advance to the southern acclivities of the Balkan ere the Allies were enabled to come to their rescue. That this apprehension was entirely without foundation has amply been proved by the gallant conduct of the Turks during the winter at the siege of Silistria. Under this impression General Burgoyne recommended the construction of a fortified line in front of Constantinople with all possible despatch, and, conjointly with his French colleague, pointed out Gallipoli as the fittest place for the landing of the Allied armies.

In the well-known article in the *Moniteur* on the expedition to the East, the reasons for this selection are thus set forth :—"The first principle in a maritime war is to select a meeting-place sheltered from the attacks of the enemy, capable of being easily defended, of easy access for the disembarkation and provisioning of the army, and of a nature to allow the latter to advance or fall back on its basis of operations, if compelled to do so, and, in case of failure, to find support there, and a refuge on board the fleet."

To such an assertion we have only to reply, that Varna would have offered all the conditions attributed to Gallipoli. There the army on landing

would have been equally sheltered from the enemy's attacks, the fortress, at the outbreak of the war, having been put into an excellent state of defence; there also provisioning would have been easy, and there too, if compelled, the army would have found shelter behind the walls of the fortress; and, in case of failure, on board the fleet. Whereas, the position of the army at Gallipoli had, for one thing, the great disadvantage of being too distant to exercise any influence over the warlike events on the Danube; while at Varna the Allies would have come into direct communication with Omer Pasha, and by their appearance alone have produced a considerable moral effect upon the Turkish army.

The article farther says:—"The Russians, by crossing the Danube at Rustschuk, in advancing on Adrianople, and in leaving to their left the Turkish fortresses, and even Constantinople, might be beforehand with us there, and cut off the retreat to our fleets engaged in the Black Sea. There was great danger there, which the foresight of the Allied governments knew how to guard against in time. A battle lost by the Turks on the Danube might have brought the Russians in a three days' march on the Balkan, and opened to them the road to Constantinople. The occupation of Gallipoli entirely covered that capital. The two Allied governments understood that a Russian army, even

if it occupied Adrianople, could not advance on Constantinople, leaving 60,000 Anglo-French on its right flank. Thus, in every point of view, to be prepared for all eventualities, the peninsula of Gallipoli was admirably selected as a landing point and basis of operations."

These suppositions are totally erroneous. At the time of the disembarkation of the Allied troops no great perspicacity was any longer required to discover the object as well as the bearing of the Russian operations on the Danube. The latter had already recalled their left wing from Lesser Wallachia, and thus abandoned that line of operations —the road to Sophia—which would have served them both to evade the Turkish defences on the Danube and the Balkan, and to penetrate into the interior of the Ottoman empire. Moreover for an advance by way of Sophia, the co-operation of the Serbians and Bulgarians would be necessary; from that they were, however, cut off, owing to weighty reasons touching Austria. The bulk of their army was thus concentrated opposite the Turkish centre; and here, if they were determined to push forward they must needs have previously besieged the strongly garrisoned fortress of Silistria, and subsequently encountered the Turkish army, already inured to war, in the fortified camp at Shumla. Omer Pasha expressed his determination

not to hazard a battle in open field before the arrival of the Allies, but, on the other hand, to take good care to oppose the most strenuous resistance to an advance of the Russians both along the Danube and in the passes of the Balkan.

At this juncture no misgivings could have been felt as to the possibility of the Russians forcing the Balkan, and still less of their strength to descend upon Constantinople.*

By the beginning of June the Allied troops had arrived in the East, and if they had disembarked at Varna instead of Gallipoli, they might from thence have menaced the rear and the communications of the Russian general, in the event of his risking an attack upon the Balkan, and given him good cause to repent so fool-hardy a movement. If, therefore, we must admit that Gallipoli was well situated as a depôt and meeting-place for the reserves, yet in in no other respect can we see its utility and still less its importance.

The *Moniteur* evidently takes infinite pains to demonstrate these untenable views, in order to

* The Russian Danubian army at the commencement of operations in the spring of 1854 amounted in all from 120,000 to 130,000 men. It has been shown on a former occasion that, after deducting the forces required for the occupation of the Principalities and the Danube, the army was reduced to 70,000 men, who, in case of an advance, had to take Shumla, Varna, and several other strongly fortified positions. What forces would have remained for a farther advance upon Constantinople, after the severe losses attending so difficult an enterprise?

mask the real intentions of the Allies, which were in fact nothing more than keeping their intervention as long as possible within the limits of an armed demonstration, and in the first instance putting the courage and strength of the Turkish army on the Danube to the test. If these were not the motives which influenced the conduct of the Allies, then it is no easy matter to solve the transcendental mystery which shrouds the views of those who projected the expedition to the East.

Ensuing events proved what was gained by the selection of Gallipoli as a basis of operations. The Russians, instead of hastening forward, as it was feared, stopped before Silistria, contenting themselves with making vain attempts to take that fortress. Had the Allies then been at Varna, they might, simultaneously with the Turks, have assaulted the besiegers and compelled them to raise the siege, or even driven a portion of them into the Danube. But they squandered away their time by marching to and fro between Gallipoli, Constantinople and Adrianople, and filling up the intervals with reviews and military shows of a rather peaceful kind. They left Silistria to its fate, disregarding as long as possible the frequent entreaties of Omer Pasha and of the Turkish government; and at length betook themselves to the

seat of war when nothing remained to be done there.

II.—THE ALLIED ARMIES AT THE SEAT OF WAR. THE SUPREME COMMAND. PLAN OF OPERATIONS.

Towards the middle of June the divisions under the Duke of Cambridge and General Canrobert disembarked at Varna, and were soon followed by the rest of their armies. In the beginning of July the Allies had concentrated a force of 54,000 at and near Varna; and at last the two commanders, Lord Raglan and Marshal St. Arnaud, having made their appearance, the devising of a plan of operations could, of course, no longer be delayed. Previous to entering upon this matter a few words will be in place with regard to the chief command of the Allied armies, as it existed in the summer of 1854.

Unity in the supreme command and in the direction of operations is an acknowledged as well as an indisputable fact. Unity, as the expression of a single will, can alone insure singleness of purpose, quick decision, and as quick an execution thereof. Yet at the seat of war we find three commanders-in-chief and as many admirals, all following their own course of action. The commanders-in-chief were instructed by their governments to deliberate conjointly upon every undertaking; and, if we bear

in mind that the advices from London and Paris had also their weight in the balance of their respective decisions, we have a fair estimate as to the results of such proceedings.

The English commander was a man of acknowledged merit, not disliked by his troops, but aged, infirm, and a too obstinate adherent to ancient warlike traditions and an obsolete military routine; slow in his decisions, superficially acquainted with the general state of affairs on the theatre of war where he was called upon to perform such important services to his country, Lord Raglan, in the very first instance, made a great mistake in selecting a staff of officers mostly incompetent for their post, and by their conduct contributing to call forth the severe strictures showered upon their commander by the English public.

Marshal St. Arnaud had the reputation of a jovial *sabreur*, and the unenviable one of an unscrupulous executor of his master's orders on the 2nd of December, 1851. He had never displayed any talent for a high military command, and though equal perhaps to carry out an expedition against the Kabyles, or to lead a division in a pitched battle, yet at the head of an army he was quite out of his place. Besides this, he enjoyed neither the confidence nor the respect of the French

soldiers, and was, moreover, in a very precarious state of health even on his arrival at Constantinople.

After the retreat of the Russians from the right bank of the Danube, and their ensuing evacuation of the Principalities, the Allies had the choice of either of the following plans of operations:—1. The offensive against the Russians; 2. An expedition to the Crimea; or 3. A campaign in Asia.

From the Russians having been permitted to execute their retreat unmolested, the Allies lost the opportunity of dealing a heavy blow against a portion of their army before Silistria, as also the chances of a favourable offensive in that year's campaign. The contrary can only be advanced by those whose ideas of war are derived solely from books and not based upon experience. The Turks, after deducting their losses, now amounted at the utmost to 100,000; the English and French auxiliaries to not quite 60,000. The cavalry of the Allies was in an inefficient state, neither had they the means of transport nor pontoons; neither reserves nor a siege train. We will not stop to inquire upon whom the responsibility of such palpable neglect and shortcomings rests; suffice it to say the evil—and one not easily to be redressed—was there, hampering in every respect the movements of the armies. The Russians, on the other hand, though not as strong as the Allies, had the

advantage of being supported by their fortresses in Bessarabia; of having a numerous and excellent cavalry, enormous means of transport, and the power of calling in a reinforcement of 50,000 to 60,000 men at a short notice. With regard to these facts, the *Moniteur* was right in stating that under such circumstances an advance upon Bessarabia did not promise any favourable issue.

But notwithstanding the impracticability of an offensive in the course of 1854, the Allied commanders might have made timely preparation for the following spring. For it was now evident that the war with Russia could not be brought to a conclusion in a single campaign. The first requisite thereto undoubtedly was to keep possession of the whole of Wallachia, and to bring the army into such a position as would insure the easiest and readiest means of beginning the offensive. After the Russians had changed their front, the Allies were obliged, for strategical reasons, to execute a corresponding movement, namely, the taking up a position with the bulk of the armies in the triangle between Giurgevo, Bucharest, and Silistria, and placing two flank corps in advance, the left upon the road to Fokshani to observe the line of the Szereth, and the right in the Dobrudja, to guard the passages of the Danube. Opposite Silistria andRassova strong *tête-du-ponts* were to be

constructed, and the position along the Wall of Trajan fortified in the most effective and extensive manner. The execution of these operations was to be entrusted to the Turks, who were to abstain from any decisive action with the Russian main army, and were, moreover, to be reinforced by an English or French division, whose appearance in the Principalities would have greatly revived the courage of the inhabitants. In Wallachia a corps of 60,000 natives was to be levied, and organised either by Wallachian or French and English officers, and embodied into the main army. With such preparations, the arrival of the reserves from France and England might have been quietly awaited, and operations with superior and well organised forces have commenced on a large scale at the approach of spring. These dispositions would have by no means prevented the Allies from elsewhere employing an army of at least 50,000 in the summer and autumn of 1854; for, as we have pointed out, by taking into consideration the possession of the defensive position just described, and the Russian declaration not again to re-enter the Principalities, and finally the obligations which Austria had bound herself to fulfil, the strengthening of the Turks by a single division of the Allied armies was amply sufficient for all possible contingencies.

The *Moniteur* asks: "But what could the united Generals do at Varna after the retreat of the Russian army? Were they to remain in an inactivity which would have led to discouragement, and from which the *prestige* of our flag would inevitably have suffered?" By no means! The 50,000 Allied troops should on no account have been left to remain inactive, but employed ere disease began to tell so fearfully upon their ranks. As to the *how* we do not at all agree with the *Moniteur*.

The Allies had the choice of the Crimea and Asia, and, in our opinion, it would have been advisable for the commanders, as well as for their governments, had they decided upon the latter, viz., a campaign in Asia.*

It cannot be denied that the prospect of a short and victorious campaign must have had great attractions for the projectors of the expedition to the Crimea. It offered the possibility of carrying Sebastopol by a *coup de main*, and thus gaining a momentary success which would have likewise had a dazzling effect upon public opinion in Europe. But such a result was doubtful in more than one respect. The forces which could be spared for the

* Odessa was then quite out of the question. A landing there for the purpose of commencing operations from that point at so advanced a season would have been scarcely short of insanity.

invasion were not equal to the magnitude of the enterprise; if the *coup de main* failed, heavy and disproportionate losses were inevitable, and would completely paralyse the conduct of the war in the East, particularly during the following year. On the other hand a campaign in Asia promised certain victory, without any of the risks almost certain to be encountered in the Crimea. There the Russians had not sufficient troops to ward off a sudden blow. The conquest of Trans-Caucasia with all the fortified places along the eastern coast of the Euxine, the rising of the mountaineers and Georgians, the establishment of new border provinces, and finally the levying of several hundred thousand combatants in the valleys of the Caucasus for a gigantic invasion of the southern provinces of Russia, would have been results of undeniable certainty and overpowering importance; and, moreover, best calculated, by crushing a portion of the Russian forces, to facilitate the offensive operations on the Danube in the spring of 1855. A corps of 30,000 French and English embarked for that object in the beginning of August at Varna, after having done their work in the mountains, might have again returned in February or March to the Danube; while 20,000 men remained at Varna and Shumla as a disposable reserve, as well as the nucleus of a great auxiliary army for the next spring.

But neither the Allied commanders nor the Western governments took this view of affairs. Their armies were encamped for two months without any fixed purpose, and only when disease and discontent spread through the ranks, and complaints daily grew more loud and threatening, was work provided for them, and the descent upon the Crimea decided. The plan for this expedition was drawn up at the Tuileries, and sanctioned, as a matter of course, both by England and Austria.

That the Court of Vienna would be gratified by the news of so distant an expedition was quite natural. It felt relieved of the increasing anxiety caused by the prospect of the war approaching the borders of Hungary and Transylvania, where since the year 1849 the materials of combustion had accumulated to a startling extent, and which the slightest spark might kindle into a general conflagration. The continuation of the war on the Danube, moreover, disturbed Austria's quiet occupation of the snug berth in the Principalities, prepared for her exclusive use at the cost of the Allies. Therefore the farther the adversaries removed from Europe to fight out their quarrel, and the more they weakened and harassed each other in a struggle of a mere local and desultory character, the more content and confident Austria

grew; for she knew she would thus become master of the entire situation.

The English, also, from obvious reasons, were charmed with an enterprise which held out a prospect of the destruction of the Russian fleet in the Euxine. In regard to the planning, as well as the conduct of the military part of the expedition, the leading *rôle* was willingly conceded to France; on the one hand to flatter the vanity of the Emperor, and on the other, in case of failure, to throw the whole of the responsibility upon him.

III.—INROAD INTO THE DOBRUDJA. PREPARATION FOR THE CRIMEAN EXPEDITION.

The two months of inactivity in the camp of the Allies was only once interrupted by a rather disastrous military promenade; the march of a French division into the Dobrudja. On the receipt of a report from General Canrobert relative to the spreading discontent amongst the troops, Marshal St. Arnaud, who, with his wife, had taken up his quarters on the pleasant shores of the Bosphorus, sent an order to provide temporary occupation for the most impatient battalions.*

"There must still be some Russians in the Dobrudja," the Marshal wrote to Canrobert; "do give them chase and somehow or other gain a

* Memoirs of a General officer on the Crimean expedition.

success which we may be able to blazon forth as a victory. It would be *à propos* as a present to the Emperor on the occasion of the national fête on the 15th of August. Espinasse would, perhaps, be the best suited for such a *coup de main*."

The order of St. Arnaud was executed, and General Espinasse entrusted with the command of the expedition. The issue thereof is fresh in the memory of all. The French columns, enticed by some sothnias of Cossacks, penetrated farther and farther into the pestilential marshes of the Dobrudja, until the airy enemy entirely vanished from the grasp and sight of the pursuers. Alternately exposed to a tropical heat and to torrents of rain, fatigue and disease began to tell fearfully upon the ranks of the division. Its losses in a short time amounted to a couple of thousand, and most of the remaining carried away with them the seeds of a fatal distemper.

The fact of employing a corps of 10,000 infantry to reconnoitre a barren and flat country, instead of a few squadrons of Hussars, is the best criterion of St. Arnaud's military capacity; the framing of a disposition like the preceding sufficiently proving how illusory the expectations were which might previously have been entertained as to the French general's brilliant achievements in the present war.

The bombardment of Odessa is a worthy counterpart to the expedition of the Dobrudja, with the sole difference that the loss sustained by the fleets was comparatively small. Both those hurried, ill-conceived schemes were manifestly undertaken for the sake of making up some sort of a victorious despatch for the impatient public in the west.

By the end of June Lord Raglan received orders from his government to take the necessary steps for an invasion of the Crimea, supposing the information he received was of a nature to warrant the practicability of such an enterprise. In the contrary case he was empowered to act as he thought best, with the condition that he was to concert measures conjointly with St. Arnaud. Lord Raglan at that time appears by no means to have approved of the scheme. He reported to his government on the impossibility of obtaining any satisfactory information, and that he considered the occupation of Perekop, as an introductory step to operations, neither advisable nor practicable. We are not aware of the reason which at a later period caused the English general to turn round and take a favourable view of the expedition; but this much is certain, that on the very day of departure for the Crimea, he knew as little with respect to the real condition of the peninsula as at the time when he despatched the above-mentioned report to

London. A numerous council of war, convened at Varna in the beginning of August, was to consider the practicability of the undertaking, and to make out the necessary dispositions. Conformable to the report of several officers of the general staff, as well as of the Generals Canrobert and Brown, who had been previously sent out to reconnoitre the south-eastern coast of the Crimea, the expedition and the landing of the army at Eupatoria was resolved upon. It was now incumbent on Lord Raglan, who held discretionary power from his government, to state his conviction as to the difficulties which, in his opinion, still stood in the way of the undertaking; in which he would have been supported by Prince Napoleon as well as the Duke of Cambridge, and also by the admirals of both France and England. But a few imperious remarks from St. Arnaud, calculated to work a change of opinion in the council, were sufficient to dissipate Lord Raglan's scruples, who, besides being pressed by the young officers of his staff, gave his full consent to the French plan of operations.

Scarcely had the expedition been resolved upon, when St. Arnaud inconsiderately and inexcusably proclaimed it to the army.

One of the very first conditions of success in such cases is the strictest secresy; in this instance,

particularly, it was doubly necessary, as by giving too rapid publicity to the plan the enemy had time to provide for his defence, and thus frustrate the enterprise. Had one of the marshal's staff committed such a piece of indiscretion, he would have been summoned before a court-martial and punished as a spy and traitor. The bravados of St. Arnaud, however, fared better; they were quietly set down to the originality of his character. The Russians, thus forewarned, dispatched reinforcements to their menaced province, and immediately set to work fortifying Sebastopol on the land side.

At the end of August, some time after the issue of the French marshal's proclamation, a second council of war was held at Varna. As the expedition had been fixed, as well as the dispositions sketched out, and the troops acquainted with their task, it is difficult to come to a conclusion as to the real purport of a second deliberation on the matter. Amongst the members of this council of war was Ferhat Pasha, who formerly, under his real name of Baron Stein, served as an Austrian engineer officer, and later, in the Hungarian army, attained the rank of general, and who from his acquaintance with the Crimea was invited to take part in the deliberations. Ferhat Pasha pointed out all the dangers of the expedition, and suggested that, as the season was so far advanced, the Allies

had better give up the proposed scheme, at any rate for the year, and employ about two-thirds of their troops in an attack upon Trans-Caucasia, leaving the rest as a reserve in Roumelia on the Danube. Having so lately returned from the seat of war in Asia, Ferhat Pasha spoke decidedly as to the state of affairs there, and guaranteed the conquest of Grusia and Mingrelia in the course of two months, also the rising of the mountaineers and the expulsion of the Russians from all the territory lying between the Euxine and the Caspian Sea south of the Caucasus. He concluded by suggesting that the campaign in the Crimea should, after due preparations, and with larger forces, be undertaken next spring, commencing at Kertch and Kaffa, and supported by the army of Asia. St. Arnaud at first seemed to concur in these suggestions; but, referring to the proclamation already issued, he declared that it was now too late to make any alterations. Thus the second council of war turned out to be a mere farce. All the English officers present were apparently caught with the plan of taking Sebastopol, and became the most zealous supporters of St. Arnaud's opinion.

IV.—INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. BATTLE OF THE ALMA.

The first division of the fleets weighed anchor on the 4th of September. The expedition assembled between the 9th and 10th, off the Isle of Serpents, and on the 10th, with fair wind and weather, it made for the east-south-east. On the morning of the 13th the white coast of the peninsula became visible, and in the evening of the same day the expedition occupied the northern portion of the Bay of Kalamita. The disembarkation of the troops began on the 14th, near Old Fort, which position was chosen after a second reconnaissance of the coast by the Generals Canrobert and Brown, and two days later the Allied army, 60,000 strong—namely, 27,000 English, 25,000 French, and 8000 Turks—stood in battle array upon Taurian ground.

The plan of the Allies consisted in landing on a suitable point, an immediate advance upon Sebastopol, an attempt at a *coup de main*, or a rapid siege, and then re-embarkation. Had the descent been effected in the beginning of August, and with due secresy, the Allies would have had full two months before them for the execution of their scheme, ere the Russians could have sent up the necessary reinforcements from the Danube. But

as it was, they had at the utmost only four weeks at their disposal, and thus not one day—one hour to spare, if they wished to avoid the risk of contending with overwhelming odds.

In regard to the point of landing, no objection can be started; from thence the armies might advance along the shore upon Sebastopol, leaning, for want of the means of transport during the whole of the operation, upon their fleets. The landing near Kaffa, as proposed by the Emperor, and from thence an advance upon Simpheropol, offered no better chances of success. The distance to be traversed by the Allies, and the means of insuring their communication, as well as of bringing up the provisions, would have rather tended to give the Russians more time for preparing their defences. Want of land transports alone sufficed to compel them to limit their movements to the coast, where, fortunately for them, Sebastopol was situated. For the occupation of Perekop, the Allies at that moment could not spare one man owing to the smallness of their own numbers.

A great mistake was made in not having disembarked a small corps at Kertch simultaneously with the landing of the armies near Old Fort, with the view of cutting off the communications of the Russians with their Circassian provinces, and of taking possession of the Sea of Azoff. The Allies

had later to pay dearly for this palpable want of foresight. The Russians in the Crimea drew continually upon the supplies, both of provisions and materials of war, at the ports of that sea; and were, moreover, enabled to reinforce their army from their military and Cossack colonies of the Don and Caucasian line.

The Russians did not attempt to oppose the descent of the Allies, but merely took up a position across the only road by which the Allies could march upon Sebastopol—the object of their operations. The consequence was the battle of the Alma (20th September), which ended victoriously for the latter. The Russians, about 35,000 strong, unable to withstand the impetuous charge of their adversaries, gave up their position and fell back towards Sebastopol.

Much has been written with reference to this battle, and the dispositions of the united commanders have been subjected to severe criticisms. As affairs stood, the offer of battle on the part of the Russians was the very thing the Allies wished for. The former could only take that step with forces greatly inferior to those of their adversaries, and it rested with the Allies so to manage the attack as to secure the total defeat of their enemy. Now that they had taken this decisive step, nothing could lead to satisfactory results—that is, to the intended

coup de main upon that fortress, save the annihilation of the Russians; or, at any rate, their entire defeat, and the cutting them off from Sebastopol. Most military critics assert that the destruction of the Russian army might have been accomplished had the Allies directed their principal attack against the right flank of the Russians, instead of their centre, and thus driving them into the sea. We for our part do not agree with this view. Such a movement, from the absence of cavalry, could only have been executed with extreme difficulty and danger, and its sole effect would have been to compel the Russians the sooner to abandon their position on the Alma, and to retreat behind the Katcha and Belbeck. The driving them into the sea—of which the critics speak—would certainly not have ensued; for we must give the Russians credit for common sense enough to have discovered their perilous position in time, to have saved themselves by a hasty retreat. On the other hand we believe that a manœuvre against the Russian left flank, executed with three divisions instead of one, under Bosquet, and supported by a simultaneous assault along the whole line, would have cut off the Russians from Sebastopol, and compelled them to fall back upon Bakchisarai. Had the Allies at this juncture followed up their success without delay and pursued Menschikoff, he would have had no chance

left but to continue his retreat upon Simpheropol, and in the event of his being cut off from that town as well, a thing by no means impossible, to throw himself into the mountains. Part of the Allied troops might then have been employed in observing the Russians, while the rest would have proceeded to the assault of the fortress.

The battle of the Alma, however, was a mere front attack, and, except the movement of the division of Bosquet, there is not one skilful manœuvre to be recorded. Had not Bosquet made his appearance just at the right moment upon the heights in the left flank of the Russians—which he did rather on his own account than in consequence of his dispositions — the latter would most likely have remained masters of the battle-field.

The two commanders may justly be reproached with having advanced without the necessary knowledge of the country and the indispensable reconnaissances which would have made up for the want of the former. Lord Raglan was quite right—though St. Arnaud took it in bad part—to await the first success of the French ere he commenced an attack with his own troops; for, to ensure victory, it was requisite first to shake the Russian left wing, and dislodge them from the road to Sebastopol; then was the time for the

English to fall upon the Russian right wing. At the continued importunities of St. Arnaud, however, Lord Raglan conceded the point, the consequence of which was a considerable loss to the Allies, and only the partial defeat of the enemy.

V.—OPERATIONS AFTER THE BATTLE OF THE ALMA. SIEGE OF SEBASTOPOL.

The Allies spent September 21st and 22nd in providing for their wounded and getting up and distributing the provisions and requisites for their camps; and, finally, in deliberating as to their future operations. On the 23rd the army advanced to the Katcha, and not encountering the enemy there pushed forward on the following day to the Belbeck, where they only found a few detachments occupying the entrenchments at the mouth of that river. It was now evident that Menschikoff was determined not to wage a second battle in open field, and thus the opportunity of retrieving the mistake on the Alma upon the banks of one or other of the neighbouring rivers slipped from the grasp of the Allied commanders. Now that they stood in close proximity to the works of Sebastopol as well as to the army of Menschikoff, the Allies, amounting to 50,000, all at once discovered, how much they had underrated the difficulties of the expedition, and in what disproportion their means

were to the magnitude of the undertaking. At the same time considerations as to their own safety began to press heavily upon them. The Russian reinforcements from Odessa were rapidly moving down by way of Perekop: thus if they persisted in their plan of operations against the northern fortifications, they ran the risk of losing their land communication with Eupatoria, and of being taken in the rear by a relieving army, while vainly sacrificing time and forces upon those works. These motives and not the sinking of a few vessels at the entrance to the harbour of Sebastopol induced St. Arnaud and Lord Raglan to abandon their design upon the North fort and to execute their memorable flank manœuvre to Balaklava. The possession of both the harbours of Kamiesh and Balaklava secured them in the rear, and offered a tolerably firm basis of operations. No wonder that both the leaders felt greatly relieved, when they found themselves sheltered; the French in their enthusiasm going so far as to call the Bay of Kamiesh the Bay of Providence.

The flank march of the Allies succeeded marvellously. Had they but taken advantage of the surprise of the enemy and attempted an immediate assault upon the city, which at that moment was weakly garrisoned, they might possibly have succeeded in carrying both the town and the arsenal

ere the Russians had time to erect regular works of defence. But, instead of this, they took to protracted reconnoitrings, in this case overdoing what had been utterly disregarded on the Alma, where a more accurate reconnaissance would have assisted them in a better arrangement of the plan of battle. Here, on the contrary, protracted reconnoitrings led to perpetual indecision and preparation, and finally to a formal siege which had never entered the calculation of the Allies in the original plan of the expedition. One daring and rapid blow, even at a heavy sacrifice, might still in the present state of affairs have led to a favourable issue, and if the Allies had not had determination enough at once to have recourse to such an extreme expedient, they ought immediately to have returned to their vessels. Pelissier, the present French commander-in-chief, would in all probability have been the very man for such a contingency; both Canrobert and Lord Raglan were wanting in energy. They thought such an act of daring did not tally with their conscience and the responsibility devolving upon them. How incomparably more victims has the winter campaign cost the Allies, than a bold assault under the protection of some easily constructed batteries at the end of September!

At length, after having given the enemy sufficient time to recover from its surprise and strengthen

its position, it was decided to lay siege to the town and to begin with the trenches. The same mistake, which led to the repulse of the Russians at Silistria, was here committed by the Allies, only in an aggravated form. They commenced the siege operations without completely investing the place, which frustrated their efforts to reduce the strength and courage of the garrison, and imparted to the struggle the character of a cannonade between two armies, in which the adversary had no difficulty in concentrating on the most exposed points such defences as continually counteracted the strenuous exertions of the assailants.

Sebastopol is situated upon the southern declivity of a ridge which, between the quarantine and military harbours, slopes gently down to the sea. Opposite the city lies a suburb, called Karabelnaia, which contains the dockyards and basins for ship-building, the arsenal, the marine barracks, together with the chief naval establishments of the port. Here the line of fortifications south of the Bay of Sebastopol commences. This line, about four miles in length, encloses the suburb of Karabelnaia, winding round the head of the military harbour, and running along the western outskirts of the city, till it terminates at the fort which stands at the north-eastern extremity of the quarantine harbour. This enclosure is formed by a continuous

stone wall three feet thick, and flanked in several points by casemated stone towers. From the time the invasion of the Allies was mooted, and particularly after their descent, the wall was additionally strengthened by a ditch, and in front of the towers as well as of the fortified barracks six bastions of earth were constructed which are numbered from east to west; three of them lying on either side of the military harbour. Since other works have been raised, the *enceinte* has assumed the appearance of a bastioned line of six long fronts, with the quarantine fort as its extremest point of support to the north-west.

The dispositions of the Allies for the siege operations were as follows:—The French to form two corps—the 3rd and 4th Divisions, under Forey, for the siege; and the 1st and 2nd Divisions, under Bosquet, for the observation of the enemy. The besieging corps to encamp in the first line, resting with the left wing on the Bay of Streletzka, and with the right on the ravine which runs to the head of the military harbour. The corps of observation to take up a position behind the 3rd Division on the road to Balaklava, and the English to establish their camp between the ravine and the Tchernaya. All these forces were encamped upon the ridge, extending in a south-westerly to a north-easterly direction, from the monastery of St. George to the

Tchernaya at Inkerman, and encompassing in a semicircle the whole of the southern tongue of land upon which Sebastopol is built.

In order to check the advance of a relieving army, a portion of the English and Turks were placed along the Tchernaya, up the valley as far as the heights of Kamara, where to the west of this village, on the road to Bakchisarai, a redoubt was erected by the Turks, to which three other field-works were afterwards added, upon the hills north and south of the former. Farther back, the heights, rising immediately east of Balaklava, were crowned with several batteries constructed by the marines, who had been sent up from the ships for that purpose. This corps of observation was, in the event of an attack from the river side, to be supported by the French corps under Bosquet.

All the defences of the besiegers being in a tolerably forward state by the 9th of October, and a portion of the siege guns also brought up to the camp, the first parallel was commenced on the evening of the same day. On the 17th, the trenches had proceeded so far as to allow of the opening of a simultaneous fire from all the batteries of the first parallel; the attack being vigorously supported by the combined fleets. The utter failure of this first bombardment is a well-known fact. Towards evening the vessels retired, with a

loss of some 500 dead and wounded, and pretty much damaged in the masts, riggings, and even in the hulls, without having done any farther harm to the Russians than to destroy some of their embrasures. The effect of the siege guns, though more palpable, did not lead to any decisive issue; for the garrison had not only time to repair the damages during the night, but also to construct new and more powerful works. In face of these facts, the Allies again took to the continuation of their works, and pushed on the trenches during several succeeding days. In spite of their perseverance, however, they made but slow progress, owing to the great difficulties of the soil. The fleets, on the other hand, having found out the inutility of attempts like that on the 17th of October, resolved to remain quiet spectators of the great drama.

VI.—RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. BALAKLAVA. INKERMAN.

While the Allies slowly toiled on towards the completion of their arduous task, Menschikoff—who, after the battle of the Alma, had retreated, by way of Sebastopol, to Bakchisarai, and there taken up a position in the flank of the besiegers—had received considerable reinforcements. The greatest part of them came from the Danube, where Austrian

intervention had left the Russians at full liberty as to their movements. If we consider that these troops had to traverse a distance of more than 400 miles in order to join the army in the Crimea, we cannot but admire the rapidity with which they executed such a lengthy and toilsome march. The first portion of those reinforcements—the Division of Liprandi—arrived at Simpheropol on the 15th of October; and on the 23rd, the Russian general-in-chief, possibly induced by the approach of the French trenches within 400 yards of the Flagstaff bastion, determined to undertake a grand move against the heights along the left bank of the Tchernaya, as a preparatory step to ulterior offensive operations on a larger scale, for which he had yet to await the arrival of the rest of the fourth corps.

On the morning of the 25th of October a large body of Russians passed the Tchernaya at Tchorgoum, and pushed forward in the direction of Kamara, with the intention of making themselves masters of the redoubts occupied by the Turks. The attack succeeded completely; the redoubts were carried in a few hours, and their guns turned against the Allies. From thence the Russians spread over the heights of Kamara and south of Balaklava, where they made the greatest exertions to keep their ground. On this occasion the English

executed a cavalry attack, one of the most brilliant ever remembered in the annals of war; but which ended in the destruction of the greater part of the Light Cavalry Brigade. A French general, who witnessed that heroic scene, and who remarked the imprudence of it and the total disregard of the commonest military rules, is said to have exclaimed, "*C'est beau, mais ce n'est pas la guerre!*"* General Gortschakoff—not to be confounded with the commander-in-chief on the Danube—having seen the annihilation of the English horse from the other side, expressed himself in less courteous terms on the following day to an English officer sent with a flag of truce to the Russian camp: "*La charge que vous avez fait hier était très belle, mais permettez-moi de vous le dire en même temps très bête.*"† I leave it to the reader to decide between the two verdicts, neither of which seem to be wholly incorrect.

This is the place for refuting the reproach made against the Allied commanders for their conduct on that day from different quarters, particularly in the memoirs of a general officer on the campaign in the Crimea. The author of this pamphlet says: "The Allies, after the unfortunate attack of the

* It is very fine; but this is not war.

† The charge you made yesterday was very fine, but allow me to tell you, that it was at the same time a very stupid one.

English, ought at once to have taken the offensive, driven the Russians from their position, and thrown them across the Tchernaya." Our belief is—and the hard fought victory of Inkerman bears witness to it—that a precipitate attack upon the strong position captured by the Russians on the 25th of October, would most likely have led to a wanton sacrifice of the troops, and rendered the Allies incapable of successfully repulsing the grand attack of their enemy ten days later. Economy of forces had already become a duty of the first importance with the Allies, who were, consequently, right in not staking their armies on one cast of the die, except in cases of dire necessity.

During the subsequent days the remainder of the Russian reinforcements made their appearance, and Menschikoff now issued orders for a general assault upon the besieging army, who, it was proposed, should at once be taken from four sides and driven into the sea.

The success the Russians obtained on the 25th was considerable. It brought them to the left bank of the Tchernaya, within half an hour of the English line of retreat, and an hour of their head-quarters. And yet the Allies had not sufficient troops to dislodge them from so dangerous a vicinity without hazarding their own position before Sebastopol. Menschikoff's dispositions for the

attack were chiefly based upon the easy success of the 25th. The principal blow against the right flank of the Allies was to be dealt from Karabelnaia and Inkerman, supported by a simultaneous sortie of the garrison against the left wing of their adversaries, whilst the corps at Kamara was to watch the moment of the Allies giving way, when it was to bear down upon their line of retreat and to accomplish their entire defeat.

The battle took place on the 5th of November. Favoured by a dense fog the bulk of the Russian army fell unawares upon the English, and, after a sanguinary contest, succeeded in dislodging them from their position and in securing a firm footing upon the plateau of Inkerman in the right wing of the Allies, ere the French were able to hasten to the assistance of their English comrades. Had the Russians understood how to make the best of their success and resolutely pushed forward with deployed forces, the Allied army would have been lost. For meanwhile the corps at Kamara had also descended from the heights, and, according to previous orders, was about to take part in the struggle. Fortunately for the Allies the dispositions of General Dannenberg, who had the conduct of the principal attack, were either misunderstood or badly executed by the Russian sub-commanders. Their columns, entangled within the limited space

they occupied, came to a dead stop, and whilst thus exposed to a furious fire of the Allied batteries, were taken in flank and rear by the division under Bosquet. After an obstinate combat they were compelled to yield and give up their conquest. On the retreat of the Russian main army the remaining two columns also checked their advance and fell back, the one pursued by the French into the fortress, and the second to its position at Kamara, which it regained without opposition.

The Allies were saved, but at what price? Well might they exclaim with Pyrrhus, "Another such a victory and our doom is sealed!" If the Allied commanders bore in mind that this victory had hung merely on a frail thread, that Prince Menschikoff with his numerical superiority could far more easily bear the losses than themselves, and might in a few days renew his attack upon their position, while their promised reinforcements were still part at sea and part in the quiet garrisons of France and England; if they considered that winter was at hand without the necessary preparations for it having been made; and if, notwithstanding all these disheartening facts, they did not despair as to the final issue of their enterprise, but still persisted in the continuation of the siege, then it is difficult to say whether their courage is more to be admired or their want of

foresight to be deplored, which latter prevented their seeing the perils of this unfortunate expedition for themselves as well as its disastrous bearing upon events in general. Dispatches from London and Paris approved of the fatal decision of the Allied generals, and the public, having no adequate idea of the difficulties and extent of the undertaking, and, moreover, encouraged in its hopes and expectations by the continual misrepresentations of the press, became clamorous for the taking of the fortress.

An abandonment of the enterprise after the battle of Inkerman and the re-embarkation of the armies would have been tantamount to an avowal of how inconsiderately and at what a wrong moment the expedition had been set on foot. And yet this avowal alone could have saved the brave troops from disasters, the foreshadowings of which were already rising in the distance. Such an apparently humiliating step would, doubtless, have required high moral courage. The soldiers proved to what an extent they possessed that courage by submitting with the greatest devotion and self-denial to the orders of their governments, while the latter equally proved their deficiency in it, as they imposed upon their armies duties not only far beyond their power of execution, but also involving the destruction of most who attempted to fulfil them. That

under such circumstances the Allied armies were not annihilated is owing neither to the sagacity of their governments, nor to the capacity of their commanders, but solely to the inactivity of their enemy.

The more the Allies needed repose after the battle of Inkerman, the more was it the interest of the Russians not to grant it, but as soon as possible to return to a second and decisive blow. In spite of their considerable losses, the Russians had still sufficient forces left to carry out their object. Menschikoff could not possibly have overlooked the fact that the winter offered the most favourable chances against the Allies. And if he still allowed that opportunity to escape, it must be set down either to his want of judgment and resolution, or to peculiar reasons emanating from the conferences at Vienna, and the prospects of peace naturally connected with them. It is also possible Menschikoff had received orders from St. Petersburg to desist from farther attacks upon the besiegers, in order not to urge on France and England to some desperate step, and thus kindle a war of cabinets, heretofore purely local, into a general struggle of nations and of principles.

In a council of war held on the 6th of November, the Allies deliberated as to the possibility and practicability of an assault upon the fortress. Some of the members pointed out the demoralised

condition of the Russians, and their heavy losses in the late battle, and suggested taking advantage of it by ordering a general storm. Lord Raglan, however, did not agree in this, and declared that, owing to the weakened condition of the Allied armies, it was out of the question to expose them to probably still greater losses than those of the preceding day. It was accordingly decided to suspend all operations for the time, except the construction of the necessary entrenchments for the protection of their position, and thus await the promised and so greatly needed reinforcements.

VII.—CONDITION OF THE ALLIED ARMIES DURING THE WINTER. EUPATORIA. RECOMMENCEMENT OF THE SIEGE. ANOTHER FRUITLESS BOMBARDMENT. CHANGE IN COMMAND.

The period of suffering for the Allied armies now commenced. The south-western extremity of the Taurian peninsula was gradually turned into a vast cemetery, where the French buried a considerable portion of their best troops, and the English not only their army, but, as it would seem, also the *prestige* of their war administration. Unexpected disasters contributed to increase the pressure of misfortune. For example, the hurricane on the 14th of November destroyed a great number of transports, amongst the rest the

splendid steamer Prince, whereby enormous supplies and almost the entire winter clothing for the English troops were lost. The soldier had no better shelter against rain, snow, and frost than his airy tent. The impassable road between the camp and the coast prevented the bringing up of daily supplies; thus exposure, starvation, disease, and the most fatiguing service in camp and trenches daily carried off hundreds of their men. The following authentic records bear a heart-rending evidence to the sufferings of the Allied armies before Sebastopol. The effective state of the English on landing in the Crimea amounted to 26,000 men; after the battle of Inkerman they had but 14,000. By the end of December only 8,000 could be mustered, and by the end of February not more than 5,000 survived the combined effects of neglect and war; and all this in spite of the reinforcements ariving from time to time to fill up the daily widening gap in the ranks. Their loss in horses amounted to ninety-eight per cent. By the end of February there were not more than eighty horses in the English camp, and these were used merely as beasts of burden. The French, though gradually increasing the number of their divisions from four to ten, were yet at the re-opening of the siege unable to muster above 60,000 combatants. Of the

12,000 Turks who had joined the expedition, more than 7000 were swept away.

Up to the end of March we see the Allies struggling manfully and nobly against these terrible odds, when—thanks to the exertions of the Western governments—their position began visibly to improve. About that time General Niel, one of the most distinguished French engineer officers, was sent out to Sebastopol for the purpose of concerting, conjointly with Bizot, the then chief of the French engineers, a plan for the continuation of the siege works. Both these officers agreed upon the trenches being again pushed forward, but in silence; that is to say, not under the cover of their batteries.

It is no marvel that, while this proceeding was productive of severe losses to the Allies, it left the Russians at liberty to construct counter-approaches, as well as a new line of fortifications, partly behind and partly in advance of their old works. Originally the French directed operations against the city proper, and the English against the suburb near the harbour and the arsenals. Of this latter attack—which, in fact, was an unimportant one—the Russians scarcely took any notice; and thus it came to pass that when, in consequence of the decrease of the English, the French had to take the whole line, they scarcely encountered any

external works there. This led Niel into the error of selecting the Malakhoff tower for the principal object of his attack. No sooner, however, did the Russians become aware of the real intention of the besiegers, than they set to work to erect counter-approaches, and in a few days had strengthened their defences on this side in a like degree to those already established in front of the city.

Notwithstanding their energetic defensive preparations along the whole line, the Russians had still spare time and forces left to transform the northern part of the bay—the real support of their army in the field—by means of numerous works, into an enormous entrenched camp, or rather a fortress, which completely commands the city, and, in the event of their success, would deprive the Allies of all the advantage of their dearly-bought conquest.

In order to facilitate their task, and to divide the attention of the enemy, the moiety of the Turkish army in Roumelia, under the command of Omer Pasha, had been transferred during the winter to Eupatoria. No blame can be attached to the conduct of the Turkish general. He surrounded Eupatoria by a line of connected field-works, and repulsed an attack of the Russians ere this line was wholly closed. Subsequently, when reinforced by the rest of his corps, he constructed several advanced

works, which served to protect the approach to his entrenchments; and when his cavalry likewise came up, he sallied forth, and, by driving back the Russians, cleared a space sufficient for the establishment of a fortified camp before the city. These proceedings were both regular and skilful. But why did not the Allies turn the services of the Turks to a better account in another sphere of action, where they might have exercised a more direct influence over the course of events? Owing to the vicinity of the Russian main army and their reserves at Perekop, Omer Pasha could not have made an advance without hazarding certain defeat. He was, therefore, compelled, during the whole of the winter and spring, to remain quietly within his entrenchments; the Russians, on their part, contenting themselves by setting a small corps of cavalry to watch his movements.

Had the Turks at once been employed in an expedition against Kertch and Kaffa, and, supported by a squadron of the fleets, taken preparatory steps to extensive operations against the Russian army in the field, what a different aspect affairs might now wear! The Peninsula of Kertch once in the possession of the Allies, and with 30,000 Turks at Kaffa, forming the van of a succeeding army, would have made the Russians extremely cautious, and altogether rendered their situation in the Crimea

precarious to a degree. On the contrary, the presence of 30,000 Turks at Eupatoria did not in the least alter the state of affairs, and was scarcely felt in the balance of operations. The strategical importance of that city was greatly overrated in the camp of the Allies. Under existing circumstances an army can only successfully operate from that point if strong enough at once to make a move against Perekop, as well as Simpheropol and Bakchisarai. As long as the Russians are able to keep the field, so long will the services of an isolated corps at Eupatoria be restricted to the city and its fortified camp. The promenades executed by the corps of Omer Pasha from Eupatoria to Balaklava, from thence back to Eupatoria, and again to Balaklava, until embodied with the corps of observation on the Tchernaya, are the best evidence what trifling benefit was derived from keeping so considerable a force at Eupatoria.

By the beginning of April the siege works were so far advanced that a renewal of the bombardment seemed to promise a successful issue. Accordingly, on the 9th of April all the batteries opened upon the Russian works, and continued their fire with unabated vigour for several days. The result thereof, however, was neither greater nor more decisive than that of the first bombardment in October. The damage done to the works was

repaired by the Russians as soon as the fire of the Allies slackened, and the perseverance of the garrison kept up to the mark by constant relief and reinforcements from without. A fortnight later the telegraph announced that the Allies had been compelled, for want of ammunition, to discontinue the cannonade; in other words, the bombardment was unsuccessful.

In consequence of this failure, Canrobert, who had hoped great things from his numerous batteries, fell into disgrace, and his place was filled by Pelissier, a man of an energetic and daring character. Pelissier directed his chief attention towards expelling the Russians from their advanced lodgments and redoubts, and thus facilitate a decisive assault against one of their fronts.

Immediately after the news of the fruitless bombardment in April reached Paris, the *Moniteur* published the article already mentioned in vindication of the expedition to the East. This article contains many erroneous statements, a few of which we will endeavour to rectify.

The first and most essential requisite in all warlike undertakings, is a perfect acquaintance with the object as well as with the means for its accomplishment, both of which must unavoidably be in due proportion to each other. In other words, you must know and determine beforehand what

your aim is, and take care that it is not beyond your power to reach that aim. The object of the expedition to the Crimea was to cripple the Russian naval force in the Euxine, which was looked upon as a permanent source of apprehension to decaying Turkey, and which in its sheltered position in the harbour behind the mighty forts of Sebastopol could only be approached from the land side. Here, then, the hostile fleet was to be attacked, and either to be destroyed or compelled to come forth from its snug refuge and accept the challenge of the Allied fleets. Both the idea of taking Sebastopol, and still more so the keeping possession of it, are inconsistent with the maxims of sound strategy, for Sebastopol is no land fortress, and cannot be defended unless assisted by a whole army. Had the North Fort been at once assailed and carried, which was not beyond the reach of possibility, inasmuch as it was then neither finished nor storm-proof, all the defences of the harbour would have been exposed in their rear. Once master of the North Fort and the heights around, the Allies, with the aid of a few batteries, might have burnt and sunk the fleet in the military harbour, which offered no shelter against their commanding fire; neither could the Russian vessels or batteries, with their guns on the level of the sea, have opposed any serious resistance

to the batteries on the heights. Such an enterprise would have required but a short space of time, and if duly executed, the Allies might have either re-embarked where they landed, or at the mouth of the Katcha, ere the Russian reinforcements could have made their appearance. The Allied commanders seem in the beginning to have entertained a similar opinion. Yet after the battle of the Alma and the serious opposition they encountered there, and in face of the delays which characterised the whole undertaking, they suddenly lost sight of the real bearing of the invasion. They advanced from the Alma to Balaklava with the intention of attempting on the south side that which they might far more easily have effected on the north. Having thus made one flagrant blunder, by turning off their line of operations, they were now hurried into a second and still more serious error by trying to do what with their insufficient means they were incapable of, viz., the siege of Sebastopol. A determined dash with the bayonet on the first day might possibly have been attended with successful results. The fortifications of Sebastopol were at that moment by no means in a state to withstand a desperate assault; the whole of its defences having consisted of a few field-works hastily thrown up, and without a steep escarpe. The Russian engineers, however,

knew how to make the best use of their time. Two weeks later storming was rendered impossible, and the Allies were compelled to follow up the consequences of their indecision by commencing a regular siege against the fortress.

The nature of trenches is not clearly defined in the *Moniteur* article. Trenches are, in fact, protected approaches towards the enemy's works, which, inasmuch as they materially impede the progress of an assault, are either destroyed or removed. As a well defended fortress, unless subdued by famine, can only be carried by storm, the trenches must necessarily serve to screen the approach of the storming columns up to the walls of the place. It shows but a slight knowledge of the subject to assert that they are merely calculated for the crowning of the covered way (which, at Sebastopol especially, could not have been the case, as there is no covered way there), and that every effort should be made for the construction of breach and counter-batteries, which are of little avail against powerful earth-works, where mines only can be employed advantageously.

The next step, after the opening of trenches had become a necessity, was to select a front of attack. Here, again, the *Moniteur* is wrong; for the French did well to choose the Flagstaff bastion, properly a small crown-work, from its

being a salient angle. The Allies, however, again fell into an error by not limiting their operations to that single point; the English selecting another front of attack which lay beyond the military harbour. Though the latter might have answered as a demonstration, had the garrison been a small and limited one, yet here it was worse than useless, from the line of attack thus becoming unnecessarily extended, and hardships and sacrifices increased proportionately. The Russians could not have offered a more concentrated resistance to one than to two attacks, and yet what an amount of labour and loss would the Allies have saved in the course of the siege, and still the chances of success would possibly have been enhanced!

The opening of the trenches at the distance of 900 metres, instead of 600, is owing simply to the nature of the locality and the Minié rifles of the Russians; but by no means to the calibre of the enemy's guns; as the effect of the heaviest calibre is not greater than that of a medium one upon earth-works loosely thrown up.

In regard to the attack with parallels, it is an additional evidence of the obstinacy with which certain technical corps, in their professional isolation, cling to antiquated formalities. The same may be said with reference to the batteries being invariably constructed before the trenches. Here,

if ever, was the opportunity for carrying on the sap in zig-zag, which is not only a rapid business, but is easily accommodated to the ground and does not impede the erection of batteries.

It is but just to say that the difficulties of the trench-work chiefly arose from the irregularity of the ground, which at Sebastopol has a very different appearance to the smooth esplanades before fortresses built in the ancient style. The reconnaissance in front was also rendered extremely difficult by the excellent Russian rifles, though an expert officer may always contrive means of getting a correct idea of a place, and would never be obliged to carry on operations like those against the Flagstaff Bastion upon a *terra incognita*.

In the beginning of April, after another bombardment, the Allies fully believed they had succeeded in partly silencing the Russian guns. But in this they were greatly mistaken; for the cessation of the fire from the fortress was merely a *ruse*. No sooner had the Russians discovered the trifling effect of the Allies' projectiles upon their earth-works, and that they could no longer silence the numerous batteries of their assailants, than they withdrew their guns from the embrasures, thus reserving them for a more favourable occasion, while the rapid and protracted practice of the besiegers destroyed their carriages as well as guns.

By their attack upon the south side of Sebastopol, the Allies embarked on an enterprise which has no strategical aim, and considering the attendant difficulties, which so greatly delay the issue, promises no compensation proportionate to the enormous sacrifices which it has already and still will cost them.

VIII.—OPERATIONS UNDER PELISSIER.

In modern warfare the electric telegraph plays an important though not always beneficial *rôle*, for it not only conveys to the enemy information of everything that is going on in the opposite camp, but also keeps the public in a continual state of feverish excitement. Who does not remember the telegraphic intelligence after the battle of the Alma, the famous Tartar message of the taking of Sebastopol, which, owing probably to the credulity or ill-will of a clerk in one of the telegraphic offices, was trumpeted forth as authentic, and did so much to turn the heads of the people of France and England?

This unfortunate mistake was one of the causes which induced the Western governments to continue the Crimean expedition, which at that moment had all but miscarried; for they felt that after their announcement of a decisive victory, and the consequent joyful excitement, a course so

utterly at variance with the expectations aroused, namely, the recall of the troops from the peninsula, would have produced too sudden a reaction on the public mind.

Since then the telegraph has continued to create and foster illusions and hopes which have never yet been realised; in consequence of which the impatience of the public daily waxed greater for a decisive blow, particularly after the second but fruitless bombardment of Sebastopol. No one staid to consider that after the heavy losses during the winter, even the preparations for a campaign had at that time in a great measure still to be made, that the reserves were partly in the Bosphorus and partly collecting in the camp at Maslak, and that the Sardinian auxiliary corps had scarcely embarked. The people were clamorous for victories at any price, and Canrobert, unable to conjure them up at a moment's notice, fell a victim to these imprudent demands.

Pelissier was more fortunate than his predecessor. He took command at a moment when the arrival of considerable reinforcements rendered the extension of operations practicable. Moreover he understood far better than Canrobert how to dress up his reports in a manner to make them palatable to the public. Here are a few samples of his despatches:— "After a series of the most sanguinary and glorious

struggles we succeeded in capturing a large *place d' armes*, and in driving the Russians into their internal works." A few days later:—"The line of the Tchernaya is occupied. The enemy has been compelled to make a precipitate retreat into the mountains. We carried the works and have definitively established ourselves there; the Russians lost 6000 in dead and wounded. On that account no demonstration took place on the 26th. On the 27th our success was complete in regard to the fortress as well as to the Tchernaya. Kertch and Yenikale were abandoned by the enemy; the depôts, batteries, and steamers blown up. The Sea of Azoff is in the possession of our fleets."

Such despatches of course completely electrified the western nations, who were predisposed to accept them as the presage of future still more important victories, or at any rate of the fall of Sebastopol. A similar popular delusion as that after the battle of the Alma ensued, and renewed congratulations at the Tuileries on the part of Baron Hübner were alone wanting to revive the occurrences of October.

The glowing visions, however, were overshadowed by the subsequent details of the events on the 22nd and 23rd of May. The result of the struggle on those days was not, as Pelissier announced, a large *place d'armes*, but merely a Russian counter-

approach only commenced on the previous day. The loss of the garrison amounted not to 6000, but to 2500; and that of the French, which was so carefully concealed, to not less than 3500. Though the Russians were compelled to give up their advanced work in that direction, the French, however, were unable to make any use of the ground, owing to the cross fire of the enemy's batteries; and the whole success—by no means an important one—consisted in clearing a space in front of the line; a poor compensation for the great sacrifice at which it was obtained!

The occupation of the left bank of the Tchernaya seemed to promise greater advantages, but not being followed up by any serious movement against the principal position of the Russians, the result, so pompously announced, was reduced to a mere successful reconnaissance, and the acquisition of a piece of ground for the encampment of the troops. The capture of Kertch and Yenikale, on the contrary, was of real import and may have a considerable influence on future operations from the fact that it deprived the Russians in the Crimea of their communications with the Sea of Azoff, leaving them but one line of retreat by way of Perekop, which may hereafter render their position critical both on account of the difficulties in provisioning as well as in reinforcing their army.

This brilliant success, acquired at the cost of only a few wounded, ought to have acted as a hint to the Allied generals that the favourable issue of decisive operations does not necessarily depend on the great number of slain; but far more on sound ideas and the execution of a plan at the right moment. The opportunity for a grand move in the field was now at hand, which the Allies could have made without discontinuing their operations against the fortress; their armies had just attained a strength, an increase of which, considering the enormous drains upon it by disease and the siege, was not likely to occur during the campaign. By the end of May they consisted of 110,000 French, 30,000 English, 60,000 Turks and Egyptians, 15,000 Sardinians, making a total of 215,000 with 300 field-pieces, which, in comparison with the Russian forces, mustering, according to authentic records, only 130,000 combatants, gave the Allies an overwhelming superiority, which ought to have been turned to the best account ere the Russian reserves at Cherson, Nicholajeff, and Perekop, could move down to the Crimea and make the balance equal. The Allies, however, with an utter disregard to the state of the Russian army, continued to direct all their attention and energies to the prosecution of their enterprise, viz., the siege of Sebastopol. Their accumulated

forces were left penned up within their entrenched camp, and with the exception of a small part employed in frequent assaults upon the Russian line, or in short reconnoitrings, the rest looked idly on.

The Russians, on the other hand, profited in every way by the inaction of their antagonists, whose manœuvres on the Tchernaya they observed by means of a few detachments, keeping their reserves concentrated upon the heights between Bakchisarai and Mackenzie's Farm, thus being prepared to throw the necessary reinforcements upon any point that might be attacked. While the right wing of the Russians in this way faces the left of the Allies from behind powerful fortifications, having all the advantages both of position and of defence on their side and harassing the latter by incessant skirmishes and sorties, the rest of the forces on either side remain in utter inactivity. It is not difficult to foresee who will be the gainer at the end of this protracted and sanguinary contest. By the reiterated assaults upon the fortress the Allies will dwindle away at a fearful rate, the Russian losses bearing no proportion to theirs; the balance between the contending parties will thus soon be restored, and the former, in spite of their indomitable courage, be unable to extend operations beyond the narrow space they at present occupy.

We will now take a hasty survey of the sanguinary actions on the 7th and 18th of June.

No sooner were the Russians aware of the intended attack of the Allies upon Karabelnaia, than they erected several batteries on the heights skirting the great bay, in order to enfilade the approaches of the besiegers. The French named these works *les ouvrages blancs*. Farther south the besieged raised a strong advanced work upon the so-called *mamelon vert*, about 700 yards in advance of the Malakhoff Tower. On the 7th of June, after an extremely violent cannonade of two days' duration, the French carried these external defences by storm, in which they were duly supported by the English, the latter making themselves masters of the rifle-pits, as well as of the quarries, in front of the great Redan, which had, hitherto, considerably impeded the progress of the French. This was truly an heroic achievement, and, though dearly bought, bears most honourable testimony to the dauntless bravery and impetuosity with which the Allies executed their difficult task. The besiegers ought now to have proceeded with the attack by means of approaches; for they could not possibly presume that the original enclosure of the city, on which the garrison had worked during eight months, would be as weak and as indifferently defended as the lately captured redoubts

and batteries, only commenced in March, and, owing to the heavy fire of the Allies, never entirely completed. A cautious, though steady advance would, therefore, have been more beneficial to them than a precipitate attempt at storming, which, whether successful or not, must lead to fearful sacrifices.

Unfortunately, the commanders had not the necessary patience; they preferred a storm at any price to a slow attack, and thus made matters worse. The 18th of June, the anniversary of the battle of Waterloo, was the day appointed for the grand assault. The dispositions issued for the advance were similar to those on the 7th of June. Three divisions of the French were to take part in the affair, the Divisions of Mayran, Brunet, and D'Autemarre; the Division of the Imperial Guards formed the reserve. The Division of Mayran had the right attack, and was to carry the entrenchments near Careening Bay; the Division under Brunet was to turn the Malakhoff Tower on the right, and the Division of D'Autemarre to manœuvre on the left. The objects of the English assault were the great Redan, and the adjoining batteries on the left of the French. A most destructive fire, which had been kept up during the previous day against those works was scarcely returned by the Russians, which led the Allies to

suppose that they had entirely silenced their guns; whilst the garrison was merely economising them for the decisive moment. It came only too soon.

Early in the morning of the 18th, the French and English columns commenced the attack. But scarcely had they made their appearance beyond their own lines, when they were assailed by such a murderous fire of grape and musketry, both from the enemy's works and steamers, that after an heroic struggle of several hours, their enormous losses compelled them to retreat behind their trenches. Such was the result of an assault projected without due consideration as to the enemy's power of resistance: a neglect only to be excused in cases of urgent necessity; for example: the immediate re-embarkation of the expedition; the critical position of the army; or the disaffection of the troops; none of which existed in the above instance.

IX.—STATE OF AFFAIRS TOWARDS THE MIDDLE OF JULY, 1855.

It was very unlikely that after such a decided repulse, a renewed attack could be immediately attempted. Thus the sum total of Pelissier's operations from the 20th of May to the 20th of June, which, besides the losses by disease, cost the Allies 15,000 men, consisted in the capture of a few

isolated redoubts and batteries, a very inadequate compensation for the force expended in their acquisition. And the worst is yet to come. Everything betokens a most determined defence on the part of the Russians. According to their prisoners, the larger works of Sebastopol have as yet scarcely suffered, and the Allies themselves may see from their camps, thousands of Russians actively employed in strengthening their defences, and constructing new ones behind them. Moreover, the command of the attacked fronts is entrusted to the most expert and resolute officers, who will doubtless strain every nerve to dispute the advance inch by inch. Yet we do not deny that the Allies may not obtain a partial success, for example, against the bastions and numerous batteries crowning the hills in front of Karabelnaia. If they can secure a firm footing upon one of those commanding points, the fate of that part of Sebastopol would soon be decided; for the arsenal and the barracks could not offer any serious resistance, and the besieged would be compelled to retire into Fort Paul, at the entrance of the military harbour. But then the sole advantage gained would be an insight into one part of the port; the Allies would still have to clear a way into the city proper, and meanwhile the Russian vessels could always find sufficient shelter against their projectiles in some corner of the great

bay. Supposing, however, that the Allies should, in the end, and at the cost of half their army, obtain possession of the south side of Sebastopol; what then? A moment's consideration of this vital question will not be out of place here. The Allies, when once masters of the town, have two alternatives; either to content themselves with what they have done, and order a re-embarkation of their troops, or to decide upon a continuation of operations; in the first case, the success of the enterprise would only be partial, for if the vessels were sunk, the dockyards, arsenals, forts, the whole city, everything destroyed on the south side, the northern fortifications would still stand unconquered, and from their commanding heights look disdainfully upon the departing squadron: in the latter case, the first thing naturally suggested to us is, whether it would not be more reasonable for the Allies to desist from expending the flower of their armies in the Crimea, and to select another sphere of action, where gain and loss might be balanced more proportionately, and the object of the war, as well as its ultimate issue, be really brought within their grasp?

If the Western governments should decide on a continuance of operations in the peninsula, for the purpose of obtaining possession of the north side of Sebastopol, they might, after having

defeated the Russian army, either limit themselves to taking up a strong defensive position along one of the three rivers, the Alma, Katcha, or Belbeck, for the sake of covering the new siege, in which case, they would not be exposed to greater eventualities than the loss of time, and the hardships of another winter campaign; or leave the hilly, rugged country and descend into the flat, unhealthy, and scantily populated northern steppes in pursuit of the enemy, where they would probably hazard all they had hitherto so dearly purchased. The northern half of the Crimea is not the proper theatre of war for the Allied troops. The nearer the Allies are to Perekop, the Russian line of retreat, the more keenly they will feel the scarcity of the land transport, the want of a sufficient cavalry, and the difficulties of getting up supplies from the fleets; while, on the other hand, the chances of success for the Russians will increase as they approach their depôts, magazines, and reserves, and bring their numerous horse to bear with full force upon their pursuers.

Under existing circumstances, the complete conquest of the Crimea can only be accomplished by successful operations on the continent. If the Allies could once succeed in driving back the Russians into the interior of their empire, the Crimea would then fall without a struggle.

The state of affairs is scarcely less promising on the other theatres of war than in the peninsula. In the vicinity of Kars an armistice has continued from July, 1854, till July, 1855; whereby the Turks have been the greater sufferers, for, owing to their miserable military administration, hunger and disease have made far more havoc in their ranks than the bullets of the Russians would have done. The latest accounts from Kars are to the purport that General Muravieff had taken the offensive, and, having occupied the most important strategical point on Turkish ground, compelled his adversaries to fall back upon Erzeroum; himself establishing his camp before Kars, in order to get possession of that town. By this successful move the Russians have become masters of the border Pashalics, and will consequently exercise double pressure upon Persia. According to the accounts from Batoum and Redout Kale, the Turks, in spite of their numerous reinforcements, are unable to make any progress there, the Georgian militia being amply sufficient to keep them at bay. Further west, along the Circassian shore, the natives had taken possession of the forts abandoned by the Russians, but, after waiting in vain to learn the pleasure of the Allies, had again returned to their mountain homes.

If we turn from the eastern to the western coast,

the scene is still more gloomy. In vain do we look for those brave fellows who, at the commencement of the war, restored the *prestige* of the Turkish arms. The army of the Danube, the only one Turkey possessed, exists no more! Her friends left nothing undone to bring about its dissolution. One part was sent to the burning shores of Eupatoria, another stationed on the rocks of Yenikale, and a third corps still helps to fill the grave-pits before Sebastopol. 10,000 to 12,000 men have been enrolled into the Anglo-Turkish contingent, and the few thousands that are left constitute the present army of the Danube. This force scarcely suffices to garrison the fortresses along the river, therefore will play, if any, a rather subordinate part in future active operations. It will easily be conceived that, under such circumstances, the Russians have no cause for apprehension as to the line of the Danube, and may in perfect security turn their entire attention to their Crimean campaign.

The war in the East, which at one time extended from the Lower Danube to Mount Ararat, on the borders of Persia, gradually disappeared like a dissolving view, until nothing remained save the siege of Sebastopol, and even that has dwindled down to an attack on one of its fronts, thanks to the marvellous plan of operations which the Allied

commanders brought with them ready cut and dried to the seat of war.

Should the campaign in the Crimea in one way or other be brought to a conclusion, the Allied armies, in their war-worn condition, will be in great need of rèpose. But whether the troops will take up their winter quarters on the Bosphorus or the Danube, will entirely depend on the choice of their commanders and their plans for future operations. Meanwhile, the ensuing truce will give the generals as well as the Western Powers, sufficient leisure to ponder over their losses, which will certainly include hundreds of thousands in men, and milliards in money.*

* The probable losses of the Allied armies up to the Autumn of 1855, will be as follows:—French 60,000, English 40,000, Sardinian 6,000, Turks 120,000; total 226,000.

CHAPTER IV.

THE REAL WAR AGAINST RUSSIA.

I.—THE WAR QUESTION IN ITS FULL EXTENT.

As the Eastern question is but one link in the great question of war which at the present moment engrosses the attention of the world, in a like manner the East itself, where the first shot was fired, forms but one of the scenes of the struggle. The question of war encompasses countries more extensive, and interests more important, than is conveyed in that empty and cautious phrase, "the preservation of Turkey." Russia exercises her pressure upon Europe, not merely in the south, but also in the west and north. From her aggressive policy have arisen all the disputes and wars in which that power has been involved for the last century and a half; the principal features of which are the Baltic and Polish question, together with the quarrel in the East. In a decisive war, these three parts of the one vital question cannot be separated

without jeopardizing the prosperous issue of the contest; they must, therefore, be simultaneously solved, and such a solution cannot but be desired by all who earnestly wish for progress and civilisation, and who in some measure comprehend the danger threatening from the north.

Since the disastrous campaigns of Charles XII. and of Napoleon, Russia has been looked upon as unassailable in her own territories. Into the causes of the failure of these campaigns no inquiry was made: the people having contented themselves with the fact of their unsuccessful termination. The consequence was that a sort of awe of the northern Giant took possession of the public mind, which was skilfully fostered by the continental governments, who, owing to their despotic tendencies, were in great need of the protection that popular delusion afforded. In proportion, however, as the genius of liberty made its voice heard, the apprehension of the governments for their own safety grew stronger: though, at the same time, the Giant's shadow fell heavier and darker over western Europe. Shielded by that shadow, France ventured upon an armed intervention in Spain, Austria in Italy, Prussia in Germany, and Russia herself in Hungary. No wonder, therefore, that for so many important services, the continental governments proved their gratitude to the Czar by

proclaiming more loudly than ever his omnipotence as well as invincibility.

The power of Russia is undoubtedly great, but not so great as her confederates and worshippers would fain make us believe, and can only become really formidable if she is permitted to use it indiscriminately for the extension of her dominion in whatever direction she pleases; in a word, if the Czar is allowed quietly to usurp the office of the preserver of European order and safety. Russia in her present condition is mainly supported by the absolute will of her ruler, the blind and enforced obedience of her subjects, the sympathies of the Sclavonian tribes, and her numerous army.

An all-powerful will, especially in time of danger and in wars of conquest, is a signal advantage, though it is often greatly marred by the incomplete manner in which, owing to defective instruments, its mandates are executed. This is especially the case in Russia, where in every branch of administration a striking want of integrity and intelligence is observable.

As to the blind and enforced obedience of her subjects, it is of value solely as long as the people can be kept in a state of total barbarism, and precluded from all contact with European culture and civilisation. If once the light of knowledge penetrates the ignorant masses, then the very tools which

up to this time have been so effective in extending the Czar's power, may turn their destructive edges against those who now wield them so injudiciously. The number of serfs in Russia in 1837 amounted to twenty-one millions. This mass of slaves, possessing little or no property, and subjected to the most oppressive bondage, will sooner or later wish for an amelioration of their wretched condition. Beyond the pale of law and society they form an isolated and neutral army in the heart of Russia, and might be gained over to the side offering the highest reward for its services. As Russia did not scruple to send her emissaries to Poland, and later to Turkey, to incite the people to dissension and civil war, for the sake of a pretext for interference in the internal affairs of those countries, and finally to despoil them; why should not the invading armies—for a noble purpose—shake the Russian empire to its very foundation by calling on the serfs and oppressed nationalities to throw off their heavy yoke.

The relationship of Russia with the numerous Sclavonian tribes is the chief support she has in her wars of conquest. The idea of Panslavism, or the union of all the Sclavonian nations into one mighty empire, was advanced when the nations in the East could no longer be baited with the "orthodox faith." The prospect of a Sclavonian millen-

nium was held out to disguise the fetters which were hidden beneath this alluring device. Sclavonian poets, some paid, and others animated by wild visions, sang for the realisation of that dazzling idea; the establishment of a great Sclavonian empire suddenly became the day dream of most of the allied tribes, and the standard of civil freedom was supplanted by that of conquest and vengeance. The northern Sclavonians were reminded that, at one time, the Weser and Elbe had formed the line of demarcation between their territories and the Germans; and that they had been compelled to recede before the latter, chiefly on account of their intestine divisions; the southerns, on the other hand, were told that their rule had in former days extended over Styria, Carinthia, Krain, and the Adriatic coast, as well as along the Drave and the Danube, and that the Turkish yoke in Bosnia, Serbia, and Bulgaria, was a disgrace to the Sclavonian name. In conclusion the tribes were reminded that to Russia alone they could look for deliverance, as she had both the power and will to chastise the Germans and their other oppressors, and to carry out the project of a universal Sclavonian dominion. Europe for a long time was not aware of the real bearing of these machinations, until some liberal members from the hostile camp warned the nations of the storm gathering over the

greater part of the continent. The real danger for Europe exists in the so-called solidarity of the interests of Panslavism, no matter whether Russians, Poles or Bohemians are the propagators of that doctrine, which in the present half-civilised condition of those races means either the deluging of Western Europe with their hordes, or a war of extermination against other races, as was the case in Hungary in 1848.

The greatest obstacle which presents itself to the general confederacy of the Sclavonians, is the old hatred existing between the Poles and Russians, which is kept alive not only by the opposite political tendencies of the two nations, but likewise by the difference in their religion, the former being of the Romish, and the latter of the Greek Church.

But the most powerful support of Russia consists in her numerous army; though here again many organic defects are to be found which render it inferior to most of the continental armies. The Russian soldier is a passive tool, patiently standing the heaviest fire; but never acting with that noble impulse and enthusiasm emanating from principle and a consciousness of duty, which are the distinguishing features of national armies fighting for a great idea, or for the liberty of hearth and home. This is the reason why the Russians, of so little value in petty and desultory warfare, best succeed

when bearing with large masses upon one point, accomplishing by their numbers that which they fail in by individual valour. The shortcomings of this kind of warfare become more palpable the more rapidly military science progresses in modern times. The improvements of firearms at long range, the tactical perfection of armies, their skill and rapidity in manœuvring, are so many advantages over the slow evolutions of troops in large masses. To this the best commentary is the battle of Inkerman, where a greatly inferior but agile enemy entailed such disproportionate losses upon the unwieldy Russian army. The Allied generals, therefore, will be doubly to blame if in the coming campaign they do not turn the excellent moral qualities of their troops to a better account than they have hitherto done, that. is in always having left the decision of the battle to charges with the bayonet and attacks *en masse*.

The Russian fleet having, since the appearance of the united naval force of France and England in the Baltic and Euxine, taken refuge in its fortified harbours, cannot be the object of any strategical calculation.

II.—THE ATTACK FROM THE SOUTH.

Of the enormous empire, stretching over the whole of the northern part of the globe, the most

important portion in a military point of view is its western moiety; both from including the capitals and a more dense population, and particularly from its contiguity to the continent of Europe. This moiety is apparently marked out as the stage upon which the armies of the west are to fight the decisive battle of civilisation against the legions of northern barbarism.

Russia may be attacked from three points: the north-west, west, and south, each consequently forming in itself a distinct theatre of war.

Let us first consider an attack from the south.

From a mere exchange of diplomatic notes and the idle demonstrations of the Allied fleets and armies the phantom of war arose, which with the invasion of the Crimea assumed a distinct and sanguinary form. Though as yet limited to an obstinate contest for the possession of a single fortress, the war, propelled by an inexorable necessity, may, even after that place has been reduced to a heap of ruins, take those gigantic dimensions and that decisive character which must in the end lead to the invasion of Russia proper.

Should events really prove stronger than the will of man, and the Allies be unable to dam up their rushing tide by a dishonourable peace, they will then have no time to lose in transferring their operations to that quarter where the greatest results

may be achieved at the smallest amount of time, money and men. The longer they tarry in the Crimea and the more troops they sacrifice there, the less they will be in a condition to throw the necessary forces on those points, the possession of which alone can secure the desired aim.

It is now too late to make Eupatoria, as proposed, the basis of operations against the main body of the Russians in the field. Two months ago, when the Allies had sufficient forces at their disposal, when the enemy's reserves had not yet reached Perekop, such a movement might have had beneficial results; but now, considering their daily losses before the fortress, while their adversaries, in the same ratio, draw upon their accumulated reserves at Cherson and Perekop, it would only bring fresh disasters upon them. Though Eupatoria is well situated as a *place d'armes*, effectually protecting the landing of troops and serving as a depôt for the supplies requisite to bring an army into motion; yet the difficulties of an expedition from thence may be discerned at a glance. By an advance in the direction of Simpheropol the Allies would have to traverse an open and mostly flat country, while, on the other hand, if they select the road along the coast, they would have to force the strongly intrenched positions on the Alma, Katcha, and Belbeck. In the former case the

superiority of the Russian cavalry would turn the scale against them, and in the latter the enemy would gain ample time to concert measures to frustrate a combined attack of the Allied forces. In either case the flank and rear of the latter would be exposed, and their operations wanting a basis. Instead of a concentric advance they would, on leaving Eupatoria, be compelled to divide their army, and at the same time operate in two opposite directions: towards Simpheropol and Perekóp. The fact that the enemy would be informed of the Allies' intention by means of the telegraph, forms one and not the least of the obstacles which beset the execution of any scheme in the Crimea.

In order, however, not to leave the Russians in total repose, the Allies, when they have once left the peninsula, should detach a Turco-Tartar corps which, supported by a division of French or English, would from Kaffa, as well as the peninsula of Kertch, give continual occupation to their adversaries, and at any rate compel them to keep up a considerable force for the protection of their province, which could only be done at the cost of their army on the Pruth and Dniester. The ulterior attack upon southern Russia should be proceeded with simultaneously from the Danube and from Asia, and carried on in such a manner as to exercise a sensible influence upon the progress of the whole

war. By their successes in the Sea of Azoff, and the eastern coast of the Black Sea, where the Russians have evacuated Anapa and retreated to the Kuban, the Allies have it still in their power, spite of their former oversights, to give an extremely favourable turn to affairs in those parts. Their first consideration should, therefore, be the establishment of several *places d'armes*, the organisation of a numerous corps of Circassians, and the union of the mountaineers against Russia. This accomplished, an advance against the Kuban should follow, and when the Russian forces were repulsed behind the Don, their military road across the Caucasus should be menaced. Simultaneously with operations on the Kuban, and along the coast of the Sea of Azoff, a corps, assisted by the Turkish forces at Sukum Kale and Redout Kale, should attempt the occupation of the Rion valley, and if successful, execute a march upon Teflis conjointly with the main army of the Turks, which would put an end to the Russian rule in the Caucasus. It is a matter of importance that both the political and religious feelings of the Georgians should be duly cared for, and their future national independence and surety against the inroads and depredations of the mountaineers and the Turks guaranteed in a satisfactory manner.

The consequence of a successful campaign in

the Caucasus, as we have already stated, would be the invasion of southern Russia, as far as the Don and the Wolga.

The chances of a campaign on the Danube are less favourable for the Allies than in the Caucasus; though sufficient if prudently turned to account to secure them some advantages even in the course of this year. The greatest benefit might be derived from the dispersion of the Russian forces along their enormous line, extending from Reni and Ismail in Bessarabia to Sebastopol and Kaffa in the Crimea. A fortnight after the commencement of their re-embarkation the Allies might already concentrate the largest part of their troops on the Danube for an offensive against Bessarabia, while the Russians, notwithstanding the numerous carts at their disposal for the transport of their forces, could not possibly bring up a sufficient body of troops to the Dniester and Pruth in less than six weeks. Thus the Allies would be ready to invade Bessarabia, subdue the fortresses there, and defeat any isolated corps who might oppose their advance, ere the Russians were prepared to ward off the blow. Moreover, the former would gain the additional advantage of establishing their basis of operations on the Lower Danube and Pruth, of pushing forward to the Dniester, and of securing the roads leading to the interior of ancient Poland. The

forces from the Crimea, together with the Turkish garrisons from the Danube and the Wallachian militia, might for a time easily defend the conquered territory. Yet their position would become critical and perhaps totally untenable, if neither preparations were made for the next campaign, nor employment given to the Russians on their western and north-western borders.

Of the six corps which make up the Russian army, 3, 4, 5, and 6, with the corps of the Dragoons, part of the corps of the Grenadiers, several reserve brigades, and numerous regiments of Cossacks, are already arrayed upon the southern seat of war.* These forces, after deducting their losses, still number at least 200,000, which, in the event of Russia being left unmolested on her other borders, may, at a low estimate, be raised to 300,000 by farther reinforcements, as the rest of the corps of the Grenadiers, part of the Guards and the reserves. Against such overwhelming odds the Allies would, in spite of their wonted valour and perseverance, and even with a great amount of skill, scarcely be able to bear up, or at any rate would have to limit their operations to keeping the occupied province, or fighting for one or other of the lines of defence; in the same way as they did during their campaign in the Crimea. In

* These do not comprise the army of the Caucasus.

which case it is obvious that their losses would increase without an adequate result, and that they would be obliged to recross the Danube to save their army from farther checks.

III.—THE ATTACK FROM THE NORTH-WEST.

In order to make up for their fruitless efforts and sacrifices in the East, as well as to insure a decisive issue to their advance from the Danube and Pruth towards the Dniester, and moreover to be able to lend a helping hand to Poland, it is most essential for the Allies to commence a campaign from the Baltic simultaneously with that in the south, which would oblige the Russians to divide their forces.

As to the attitude of Austria and her influence upon the course of operations we will hereafter offer a few observations.

The chances of an attack upon Russia from the Baltic provinces would be greatly enhanced by the Swedes unsheathing the sword on the side of the Allies. The Swedish army is excellent and ably officered, and might, without great effort, be brought to the strength of 60,000 to 80,000 combatants. But to secure the alliance of that nation, the Western governments must frankly and honestly explain their future intentions as to Russia; for, not-

withstanding that the Swedes are animated against the Muscovites by a deep-rooted national hatred, and have many an old grudge to pay off; notwithstanding that they would find trusty Allies in the German Baltic provinces, as well as in Finland, where the whole coast along the gulf, including that portion on which the present Russian metropolis stands, once formed part of their realm; in spite of these facts, neither the Swedes nor their government would join in a struggle, unless certain that they would not be left alone and exposed in a single-handed combat to the vengeance of Russia.

The Allies must, therefore, declare that it is their firm intention not to continue this sham war, but in right earnest to despoil the northern Giant of all his ill-gotten gains, amassed within the last two centuries, and from which he draws his resources for farther aggression.

It is evident from the scanty laurels that have been hung upon the mastheads of the united fleets during the past as well as the present year, that they can do but little unless assisted by a numerous army. At present the sole employment of that powerful naval force consists in bombarding isolated forts or towns, and in capturing a few trading vessels and fishing barks. In the event of an attack from the north-western borders being decided upon, the part of the Allied squadron in the Baltic would

be similar to that in the Euxine, viz., besides blockading the Russian ports, transporting and landing the troops and materials of war, to protect the disembarkation of the expedition, and to assist in keeping the occupied points along the coast.

Now, supposing that 100,000 French and English, and 60,000 Swedes had landed in the Baltic provinces, what would be the most advisable plan of operations to commence with?

The coast of the Baltic being still more difficult to defend than that of the Euxine, the Russians would beyond doubt prefer occupying their sea-fortresses, and taking up a defensive position farther inland, to scattering their forces along the seaboard. After deducting the necessary troops for the occupation of the southern seat of war, as well as of Poland, the Russians would then scarcely be able to oppose in the north-west above 120,000 to 150,000 men, namely, the corps of the Guards, part of the corps of the Grenadiers, as well as of the 1st and 2nd corps, the Finland division, and a few reserve brigades.

It would be unwise of the Allies, with such superior forces at their disposal, to attempt the conquest of both Finland and the Baltic provinces, for by dividing their armies they would weaken themselves so considerably as to render a decisive blow on either point quite out of the question. A

campaign in Finland would only hold good, if the Allies did not meditate the restoration of Poland, and merely limited themselves to the taking of Helsingfors and St. Petersburg; which would prove a strategical mistake, and the more to be regretted as Russia, when freed from the fear of a Polish insurrection, would despatch all her forces in the north against the invaders, who from the early setting in of winter in those countries, would run the risk of losing the co-operation of their fleets, and be left to their own resources.

The landing in the Baltic provinces, on the contrary, offers considerable advantages, and might be effected almost without opposition owing to the peculiar nature of the coast, which is intersected by great gulfs, such as those of Finland, Riga, &c., leaving it very much exposed to naval attacks.

Having effected a landing, the first move of the Allies should be in the direction of Revel, the capture of which would open a safe harbour for the purpose of commanding the Gulf of Finland, and of making the Russians tremble for their metropolis. The next objects might be Riga and the mouth of the Düna. The occupation of the former would put the Allies into the possession of the road to Poland. From thence they could immediately advance into Lithuania, take Wilna, and call the Poles to arms. Should the Russians commit the

imprudence of awaiting the attack of their adversaries near the coast in isolated detachments, instead of taking up a shorter line of defence farther back, the Allies would then be enabled to commence the campaign with several successful engagements, which would beyond doubt have a favourable influence on their subsequent operations.

In the event of the Russians being driven from the Baltic provinces, their line of retreat would diverge in two directions, one upon St. Petersburg, and the other upon Poland. Their old ruse of falling back towards the interior would now rather do them harm than good, inasmuch as the Allies would certainly not be caught, like Napoleon in 1812, but content themselves with their acquisition, and only follow the enemy cautiously, till they reached the boundaries of ancient Poland.

IV.—POLAND.

We use the term "the boundaries of ancient Poland" because the conquest of the Baltic provinces would be of little value if not considered as a stepping-stone to the liberation of that country.

One of the main points in the Allies' new war programme should be the restoration of that once mighty state, which on account of its position forms

the real barrier to the encroachments of Russia. If this be not the leading idea of the invaders, the Czar will very soon recover from his alarm, and, by bringing overwhelming forces into the field, render the efforts and enormous sacrifices of his adversaries unavailable.

Much has been written and said of late in regard to the restoration of Poland, the Poles especially having taken advantage of the present favourable complication of affairs to bring their cause before the nations and their governments, and to solicit their assistance in the recovery of the independence of their country. The opinion that without a re-suscitated Poland, Europe will never be safe from northern aggression, daily gains ground, and, if the war should last, will be universally adopted. It has been argued that Poland had a large share in her own ruin, and would never have fallen so easy a prey to her rapacious neighbours but for her own internal dissensions and wars. This may be partly true. Yet is the highwayman less guilty because the traveller whom he despoiled was infirm? Where is the country whose history, like Poland's, has not its dark and blood-stained page? Take for example the religious wars, the Eve of St. Bartholomew in France, the distracted state of that country under the Regency and Louis XV., the thirty years' war, the decline of Spain under the

last of the Hapsburgs and their successors the Bourbons, finally the great revolution in England itself; are not all these events the result of a similar unsettled political condition, which produced the civil wars in Poland shortly before her fall? And have not all those countries—Spain perhaps excepted, where the inquisition and the Hapsburg-Bourbons made the curse of their rule permanent—rapidly recovered from the effects of their misfortunes, and, as if regenerated, attained a marvellous height of culture and prosperity? Are the Poles alone to do continual penance for the failings of their forefathers? Have they not the same power to heal up old wounds, the same vitality for their own free and independent regeneration? Vain are the attempts to palliate by subterfuges and sophisms the political assassination perpetrated on that nation, and call that crime prescribed, as if wrong became right in the lapse of time. Whatever mercenary writers may advance, Poland has as much right to exist, and have an assigned place amongst the independent states as any other power whether great or small, from England down to Hesse Hombourg and San Marino. Whatever pains her oppressors may have taken to blot out the name of Poland from amongst those of other nations, and though she has ceased to exist as a power, yet the spirit of the

Poles is as strong and as determined as ever, and will never rest till the liberty of their fatherland is restored.

Shortly before the first partition, J. J. Rousseau, being asked his advice as to the future of Poland, by one of her noblest sons, replied,—"You cannot help being swallowed up, but take care that you are not digested." And the Poles have taken care not to be digested with a perseverance such as very few nations suffering under similar misfortune have shown. Eighty years have elapsed since the first dismemberment of their land, which was succeeded by a second and third; the incorporation of the grand duchy of Warsaw, the rising of the nation in 1830, and their unfortunate war of independence, and at length came the suppression of the republic of Cracow. But in spite of these tremendous strokes of adversity, the nation has retained its primitive vitality and force. Russia, subsequent to 1831, employed all means to extinguish every relic of historical and traditional memory, as well as of national feeling in Poland; her very language and laws were replaced by those of Russia. But all in vain. Without an army of occupation, Poland would be lost to Russia, and this continual pressure upon her has increased the hatred of the people to such a degree, that an attack upon Russia from the west or north-west would be now far more energetically supported,

than was the case on former occasions, particularly in 1812.

The importance, nay, the necessity of the assistance of Poland in decisive wars against Russia has been sufficiently demonstrated by the greatest generals of their day, Charles XII. and Napoleon. When the former discovered the portentous growth of Russia, he foresaw the baneful influence that power would exercise over his country, and that the best check against the rising Colossus lay in the strengthening of Poland. Accordingly he expelled Charles Augustus of Saxony, the ally of Austria and Russia, from that land, obliged him to resign the throne, and summoned the Poles to select another king. Their choice fell upon Stanislaus Lesczinski. Unfortunately they did not immediately recognise the bearing of the Swedish king's intentions and proceedings, and refrained from aiding him in his war with Russia. The indifference of the Poles deeply mortified Charles XII.; he lost patience, and ere peace was entirely established in their land, embarked single-handed in the fatal struggle against his northern foe. His doom was sealed. At Pultova he lost the battle and the fortune of his arms.

The issue of Napoleon's campaign in 1812, is a still stronger evidence of how little can be effected in a war against Russia, without an alliance with

Poland. Napoleon, like Charles XII., saw the danger that threatened Europe from the north, and was likewise convinced that Russian civilisation tended merely to foster a lust for conquest in the people, and to tempt them to exchange the rough north for the genial climate of the south.

Having pretty frequent opportunities of studying the Russians at home and abroad, Napoleon saw that Europe had no time to lose in forestalling them, before fully qualified for conquest. This led him to undertake that gigantic invasion of the north, with the armies of the west and south.

"Did not Marius, that untutored contemporary of an advanced civilisation, with his proletaries from Latium, and his sun-burnt veterans from Africa, in the same spirit break the tide of the northern barbarians at Aix and Vercelli, and thus for three centuries delay the inroad of the Gothic hosts?"* Thus asked Napoleon in a familiar conversation with one of his generals, and on the latter remarking that the restoration of Poland was the preparatory step to damming up the flood of northern barbarism, the Emperor replied that he would never undertake it. "I will summon a kind of diet at Warsaw, for the purpose of facilitating the new levy of recruits, but nothing more. I will combat Alexander with honest weapons, with

* Narbonne.

2,000 guns and 500,000 soldiers without an insurrection. I will wrest Moscow from him, drive him back to Asia; but I will not suffer a single club either at Moscow, or at Cracow, or in any other place. I want Poland, as a disciplined power, to send her sons to the battle-field. It is expedient to rouse in Poland the national spirit without touching upon the liberal one. We must, therefore, march rapidly through the land, leave its borders far behind, drag the whole of the male population along with us, lead them towards the north, at the same time stunning both friend and foe, only in a different manner." These were Napoleon's views with regard to Poland, during his advance upon Russia. He perceived the necessity of dragging the Polish forces along with him, but would not hear of the restoration of Poland, as if the formation of a Polish army could exist without the organisation of a Polish state! This contradiction between the necessity of a measure, and the faulty manner of executing it, is explained by Napoleon's relationship with the Emperor of Austria and his own horror of every popular movement; hence it came about that instead of taking breathing time on the northern boundaries of Poland for a fresh spring, he hurried on in the track of the Russian army, as far as Moscow. Had not the Emperor of the French

been guided by the false notion of crushing Russia at a single blow; had he limited his first campaign to freeing Poland, and remained there until he had firmly established that realm within its ancient boundaries, he might then in the course of the following year have marched against Moscow, and, with the aid of the Turks, wrested southern Russia from the Czar, without having exposed himself to a single catastrophe. But a total want of magnanimity, nay, even of a liberal egotism, involved him in disasters which could not be repaired, and ultimately led to his own tragic end. It is true he carried on a regular war against Russia, with 2,000 guns and 500,000 soldiers; he advanced with his usual confidence, but without securing, in case of need, a safe refuge in the enthusiasm and self-sacrifice of a resuscitated nation. The result was that his guns and legions, together with the prestige of his arms, were swept off like chaff before the wind. He traversed Poland on his retreat still more precipitately than on his advance, and as there was no unconquerable barrier erected, in the form of liberated Poland, to check the advance of a victorious enemy, the miserable relics of his army felt themselves safe only behind the Elbe, when upon German soil. The fate of both Charles XII. and Napoleon affords a grand lesson, in teaching us that, without restoring Poland to her pristine extent and

independence, Russian aggression cannot be successfully and lastingly repelled. If no trusty and vigilant warden is appointed to keep fast the flood-gates of ambition, who is to prevent its tide from bursting them open, at a moment when least expected?

In the present war people are beginning to discover that the decisive blow against Russian power can only be struck from Poland. Yet the fear of a struggle of nationalities and liberal principles is carried so far that, instead of imitating the wise policy of Charles XII., or at any rate the half-measures of Napoleon, the Western powers have not even courage to speak openly of such a plan, and much less to carry it out.

The entreaties of the Poles to be allowed to take their share in the contest have been rejected, and only permission granted them to join the ranks of the Turkish Cossacks. The offers of able Polish generals to form a legion of their countrymen has met with a similar fate, on the grounds that Turkey, and not Poland, is concerned in the quarrel. The Western Governments have done all in their power "to warn the oppressed nations that there is no hope of resuscitation for them." Such is the spirit of the nineteenth century; the so-called age of progress and civilisation!

It would be well for Western Europe to head the the storm gathering from the Adriatic to the Arctic

Seas, and from the Upper Maine and Elbe to the Irtish! As little as is the tendency of Russia to universal dominion a dream, even as little is the solidarity of the Sclavonian interest a fiction. Amongst those numerous tribes, the Poles alone have until now constantly opposed the schemes for Russian aggrandisement. The old hatred still separates the two mightiest offsprings of one family just as much as it did a century ago. Poland still looks towards the West for salvation. Would it, however, be surprising if the Poles, threatened as they are by the spreading of the German element, were at last to throw themselves into the arms of their oppressors, to whom they are at least related both by descent and language, for the sake of saving their nationality, and taking vengeance on those who ought to have supported them in their time of need? Thus Poland, who from her position seems to have been destined for the protection of Europe against Russian encroachment, would form the advanced guard of Panslavism, to deluge the continent with its countless hosts.

It is needless to point out the electric effect that the appearance of the Allies in the Baltic provinces, and their calling the Poles to arms, would produce on that nation. The immense and varied resources which the former would find there for the continuation of the struggle would re-act most beneficially

upon their own expenditure in men and money. The alliance with the Poles would more than repay Europe for affording them the means of establishing their independence on a firm basis. As peace would be indispensable to carry into effect their plans of regeneration, they would surely strain every nerve to make the war a short and decisive one, and to help to restore to Europe the blessings of a lasting peace.

V.—PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA.

It is now time to touch upon the two great German powers, Prussia and Austria. As regards the former, it is obvious that she cannot seriously interfere with the policy of the Western governments. Her entire strength consists in her people, and her existence as a state has ever been identified with reforms. Her history from the period of the Elector Frederick I. bears testimony to this, and as often as she forgot her mission as often was she humbled, while, in the contrary case, she rose far above her neighbours. What a contrast between Prussia under Frederick the Great, and Prussia under his successor Frederick William II.! How pitiably the narrow-minded court policy of Frederick William III. terminated in the year 1806! And, on the other hand, what a noble part did that very

monarch play, when men like Stein and Hardenberg became his counsellors! Again, in 1848, we see the eyes of all Germany turned towards the King of Prussia, to whom the revolutionary Parliament offered the crown of the German empire. The policy of the Cabinet of Berlin, however, rejected the magnanimous offer, preferring to send their troops to Saxony and Baden for the purpose of crushing the popular movement. The consequences were the re-establishment of the Diet at Frankfort, the occupation of Shleswig-Holstein by Austria, the defeat of the Prussian policy in Hesse; in a word, the complete humiliation of Prussia. Those who imagine that that Power would openly enter into an alliance with Russia must know very little of her position. Upon what foundation could such an alliance be based? Upon the Chambers? Though by no means democratic, they most unequivocally expressed their opinion on that score during the debate on the last loan. Upon the army? Are not its officers for a great part liberal, and, at all events, perhaps the most enlightened in Europe? Moreover, the regular army consists of 120,000 men, a force which scarcely suffices to garrison the larger towns and fortresses. Upon the militia? Upon the people? The Western powers must have very little confidence in their own cause if they do not feel that the moment they declare themselves

for freedom and progress, the immense majority of that people will lend them their efficient support. And with Prussia the entire north, as well as the south, of Germany, will go hand in hand.

All that the Court of Berlin and the German Princes can do under existing circumstances is to remain neutral as long as possible, and later, when events become more pressing, to declare against Russia. If they should not take that step their doom will be sealed, for the German people, with their friendly feeling towards the Allies, will then step into the places of their Princes.

Of higher importance is the attitude of Austria, as regards the operations of the Allies on the Continent, and especially at the southern seat of war. An army of invasion on its advance from the Pruth and Dniester will be constantly threatened in both flank and rear as long as Austria is permitted to persist in her dubious policy. Should the present campaign lead to one in Bessarabia and thence to a farther advance upon the interior of Russia, the Allies will be compelled categorically to demand from that power a declaration *for* or *against*. While in the North the neutrality of Prussia might be endurable, that of Austria in the South would paralyse the progress of operations and make the Allies dependent on the caprice of the Vienna Cabinet. The question now is whether Austria

would listen to a peremptory summons and declare herself ready to join the Western powers in an open and honest alliance; or whether—true to her ambiguous policy—she would by empty promises continue to evade a direct reply.

Since the commencement of the war the Allies have in good faith counted upon Austrian assistance, but their expectations up to this time have proved delusive. The people of France and England have been at a loss to understand why Austria, who in former wars displayed such energy and perseverance, and whose material interests might possibly be enhanced by the successful termination of the present one, so pertinaciously avoids taking an active part in the struggle against Russia, though powerful enough to cope with her even single-handed. The Western nations do not remember that the Austria of to-day is not the Austria of old, and that she is wanting in one indispensable requisite in a war against Russia, viz., in the hearty co-operation of the people. Amongst the nations inhabiting the heterogeneous countries represented by Austria, the most prominent is Hungary, where in former days she found her chief support, and which enabled her to play so active and conspicuous a part in the events of the world. Though constantly curtailed in their rights, the Hungarians have, with unprecedented devotion and

heroism, twice rescued the tottering throne of the Hapsburgs from certain destruction: once in the time of Maria Theresa, and later, from the ambition of Napoleon; and that people would again have stood forward to form the van of the Austrian forces in their attack upon Russia, had they not in 1848 and 1849 been sacrificed to the wanton mania of the Austrian government for centralisation. This unjustifiable conduct transformed the hitherto chivalrous and loyal Hungarians into the most deadly foes of the Hapsburgs; and they now only wait for a favourable moment when they will rise to a man to avenge their wrongs and for ever shake off the hated foreign yoke. The Hungarian portion of the Austrian army, superior to the rest both in point of dauntless bravery and physical power, has thus become a double-edged sword, which will at the first opportunity turn against Austria herself. The feelings of the Magyars are likewise shared by the Italians, Southern Sclavonians and Wallachians; and these are the principal elements of the forces to take the field against Russia; as the other corps would in the meantime necessarily be employed in keeping down the probable national movements in the interior of the empire. But what would become of that army after one or two defeats, especially if, at the same time, an insurrection should break out in Italy and

Hungary? Why, the apparently splendid but unnaturally conglomerated body of troops would crumble to pieces, and the Russians would without encountering any material impediments cross the Carpathian Mountains and lend a helping hand to the rising Hungarians and Sclavonians, as they did in the contest of the Serbians and Greeks against the Turks. With such a prospect in store it is not astonishing that Austria does not hasten to declare war against Russia, but, on the contrary, prefers reducing her army in Galicia, "on sanitary grounds," as the English Parliament has been officially assured, and sending back the troops into their former garrisons.

This "*parturiunt montes, nascetur ridiculus mus,*" of Austrian exertions during the present complication of affairs, is entirely to be attributed to the Russian intervention in Hungary in 1849, which was then looked upon with approbation by the majority of the French National Assembly, and to which the liberal government of England, in other respects so vigilant as to the political state of Europe, raised not a single objection.

At that time, when the mediation of the Western governments would have prevented the Russian invasion, Count Ladislas Teleki, the then representative of Hungary at Paris, came forward with a memorial, in which he, in the most impressive manner,

pointed out the danger that such a proceeding would bring down upon Europe. The only reply the Count received was: "We cannot help you; the intervention will save Austria, and she is indispensable to the balance of power, as well as to the future peace of Europe." No arm was raised in favour of Hungary; no attempt was made to settle the differences by a judicious and timely interference. The Governments looked on with indifference at Hungary's downfall, in the full belief that by so doing they were serving Austria; and, moreover, cherishing the hope, that she would hereafter become the natural barrier against the aggressions of her mighty neighbour; as if Russia would, in face of her own interests, have made such efforts and sacrifices for the purpose of raising an obstruction before her very door, and establishing the balance of power in the east of Europe!

What the aim of Russian intervention in Hungary was, is now pretty obvious, together with the fact of how far it has tended to promote the interests of Austria. It has compelled her to destroy the last vestige of constitutional existence in her dominions, and to sacrifice the system of federalism to an irrational centralisation, which, having checked national development, has brought the nationalities to a state of utter desperation.

From the day when Paskiewitsch reported to

his master, the Czar, "*La Hongrie se trouve aux pieds de votre Majesté!*" the Austria of old has ceased to exist, and the new one commenced without a true vital principle, powerless abroad, and with her internal strength resting upon an insane terrorism.

Russia, with her armed intervention in Hungary, accomplished her purpose, that of crushing the independence of the only nation in Eastern Europe which, whenever the Poles attempted to shake off their yoke, was ready to assist her neighbours. Hungary, by her political existence and vital power, was an eternal check to the extension of Russia towards Turkey; and, situated as she is between the Northern and Southern Sclavonians, formed an obstacle of the most serious nature to the propagation of Panslavistic ideas, and in a general war, would have compelled Austria to side against the northern aggressor, and thus have given a favourable turn to affairs. But, by the downfall of that country, Austria herself received her death-blow, for she became morally, as well as physically, dependent on the mercy of Russia. How fully the Czar Nicholas felt convinced that he held Austria in his grasp, is unequivocally expressed in his private conversation with Sir H. Seymour, published last year, in which he said, that whatever he did was approved of by Austria! And though Prince Schwartzenberg's assertion,

"*L'Autriche étonnera le monde par son ingratitude,*" is held forth as a refutation of this, yet his successors in power have, until now, done little to substantiate the truth of that assertion.

Deeds speak better than words. If we attentively follow the course of Austrian policy since the year 1849, the principal features of which are the intervention in Shleswig-Holstein for the sake of a dynasty completely under Russian influence, her oppression of the constitutional movements in Hesse, her incessant menaces against the sorely-pressed Porte, and the mission of Leiningen, preparatory to that of Menschikoff; we see in all these facts a manifest proof of the good understanding which up to a certain period existed between the Courts of Vienna and St. Petersburg, and that both those Powers had the same objects in view, viz., in Germany the humiliation of Prussia as well as the undermining of all constitutional life, and in the East the weakening of Turkey by a continual interference in her internal affairs, and the frequent inciting of the Southern Sclavonians and Greeks to insurrection.

In no country since the beginning of the present war, and particularly during the first period thereof, has so much been written on the decay and the imminent breaking up and re-construction of the Ottoman Empire as in Austria, and nowhere have the Turkish army and its able commander-in-chief

been so maliciously criticised as at Vienna. When the war first became really serious, and the prospect of a dissolution of Turkey more and more distant, the Austrian government at once discovered that ambiguous language was preferable to an open expression of its opinion, and accordingly the Vienna press desisted from the abuse of Turkey and turned its more or less direct attacks against Russia. By this course and also by her apparent adhesion to the Western alliance, together with her having concentrated an army of observation in Galicia and Transylvania; moreover by her reiterated assurances of a speedy change, from a mere demonstration to decided action; and, finally, by the conduct of her envoys at Constantinople, who well knew how to assume the appearance of warm friends of Turkey, and how to make people forget her hostile proceedings against that country since 1848 and 1849,* by dint of this tortuous course, as well as by having secretly promised Russia at any rate to remain neutral,—Austria has succeeded in keeping up an *entente cordiale* with the Western

* The inciting of the Bosnians; the open and active support of the Montenegrins; the brilliant reception of their Prince, Daniel Pietrowitsch, at Vienna; the mission of Leiningen; the original text of the Vienna note; the protest against the entry of the Allied fleets into the Black Sea; the important services of the Austrian consuls in continually supplying Russia with intelligence; the attitude of the Austrian press at the commencement of the war, and lastly, the outrageous conduct of the Austrian army of occupation, as well as of their employés in the Principalities.

Powers, in excluding Prussia from the conferences and securing for herself the lion's share in the quarrel, the possession of the Principalities. It cannot be denied that the Austrian government has shown great tact in deluding the Western Powers as to its real intentions. But however successful this crafty policy has hitherto been, it has now, probably, reached its climax. Even her greatest partisans begin to discover that Austria has simply been serving Russia at the cost of the Allies, and that the signal reverses which the latter have encountered in the course of this war are owing to Austria's neutrality.

This neutrality has, in regard to the Allies, assumed a still more equivocal hue since the Court of Vienna found it desirable to lay aside the last remnant of a demonstrative character against Russia, and to reduce her army, excepting that in Italy, to a peace-footing. In this way, freed from all uncertainty and apprehension along her western and south-western borders, from the Baltic to the Black Sea, Russia is placed in the extremely favourable position of being able to march superior forces to the southern as well as the northern seat of war; and the Allies may, probably in a short time, have to cope with twofold numbers of their adversaries. Austria will then be pressed to fulfil her promises; and it remains to be proved whether

she will declare *for* or *against* the Western Powers. The former case is possible only, if Austria should suddenly change the whole of her political system of 1849, renounce all attemps at centralisation, and re-establish the former federal form of government; in a word, if she should pursue a liberal and straightforward policy to avoid exposing herself to an attack from her own subjects, at the moment of engaging in a war with Russia.

If the Hapsburgs only knew how to recover the affection of the nationalities, they might perhaps in right earnest go hand in hand with the Western governments, and play a prominent part in the struggle. Yet how can we presume that the same men, who since the year 1848 have strained every nerve to build up a political edifice upon arbitrary power and brute force, upon gendarmes and employés, will themselves raze to the ground the very structure upon which they have hitherto looked with so much complacency? Is it not far more probable that in an emergency they will rather curry favour with Russia, and conjointly with that Power turn as a last resource to the re-establishment of the Holy Alliance? The Austrian government looked and still looks to the Czar as its principal support; and although perhaps not sorry to see its formidable protector a little humiliated by the Allies, and even going so far as to wish that Russian influence over

the Southern Sclavonians in Austria as well as in Turkey, may be checked, yet as to breaking or even limiting, the Russian power, that government will never give its consent; being well aware that, on account of the geographical position of Austria, neither distant England nor fickle France could in time of need offer the same assistance to her as the master of all the Russias, the representative of a stable, unchanging tyranny. All this is so patent that no farther reasons are required to show why Austria, instead of acting as a barrier against Russia, has rather hurried on the danger which threatens Europe from the north.

A real guarantee against those dangers can, as we have already stated, only be found in restored Poland and in the formation of a mighty federal state, consisting of all the countries along the Danube, from the northern Carpathians to the Adriatic and the Black Sea. Those countries, comprise: Hungary, Transylvania, Croatia, Sclavonia, Dalmatia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Herzogovina, Serbia, Moldavia, Wallachia, Bessarabia and Bukovina. Their geographical position, as well as the distribution of their inhabitants, the Hungarians, Southern Sclavonians and Roumanians, their special interests and past traditions and history, do not reasonably permit of their amalgamation into one centralised state. The tie of confederacy alone can unite them,

should their future development and their political existence be rendered practicable. Out of this necessity follows the re-establishment or formation of three states: Hungary, Southern Sclavonia and Roumania or Wallachia. Though independent, and each with a constitution of its own, they might still be ruled by a central government, charged with the superintendence and settlement of their international relations, and of their commercial as well as warlike interests. Whether this federal government would be a republican or a monarchical one, must depend on circumstances and the farther development of events. Such a Confederation of the Danubian countries, bounded in the north by the Carpathians and the Dniester; in the south by the western range of the Balkan and the Danube; in the East by the Black Sea; and in the west by the Adriatic, watered throughout its whole length by the Danube, and inhabited by twenty-four millions of thriving people, a part of which is far advanced in civilisation,* would offer a very different guarantee

* The Hungarian State (Hungary and Transylvania) . . . . 12½ millions of inhabitants.
The Southern Sclavonian State (Sclavonia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia, Montenegro, Dalmatia and Herzogovina 6 millions of inhabitants.
The Roumain or Wallachian State (Moldavia, Wallachia, Bessarabia, and Bukovina) . . . . 5½ millions of inhabitants.

Total 24 millions of inhabitants.

against northern invasion to that of Austria, who, in spite of the favourable opportunity and the encouraging efforts of the Western Powers can never venture a shot against her neighbour without hazarding her own existence.

Hungary, in her late war of independence, notwithstanding that she was limited to her own resources, and cut off from all communication with other countries, raised in the course of a few months an army which menaced Austria with utter destruction, and could only be brought to bay by the display of the whole military resources of Russia. The Hungarian army then mustered 160,000 combatants, which, had the contest continued, would have increased to double that number. The Southern Sclavonians, most of them warlike, brave, and well-armed, could easily raise an army of 150,000; while the Wallachians would bring up from 80,000 to 100,000. These united forces, making an army of 500,000 men, would be at the disposal of the Western Powers in the event of their deciding to attack the Czar in right earnest, with the proviso, of course, that the just demands of those people should be treated in an honest and equitable manner.

VI.—ITALY.

The same principles that should regulate the conduct of the Allies in their work of deliverance on the Danube and the Vistula, ought to be acknowledged and pursued with reference to Italy.

The first step towards that object has already been taken, by Sardinia having joined the Western alliance. At the time when the debates on this important question were held in the parliament of that country, the liberal Opposition was divided in its opinion on that score. This arose from the peculiar fact that the interests of Italian nationality stood in apparent contradiction to those of European civilisation. The manner in which the Allies ushered in the war, their constant subserviency to Austria, the treaty of the 2nd of December, and their peculiar interpretation of that phrase, the "integrity of Turkey," have together tended to dishearten many of the liberals in Sardinia, who exclaimed: "Shall we, who have hitherto been the champions of Italian liberty and independence, suddenly join our bitterest enemy? Shall we, in a few days, sacrifice the fruit of our perseverance and efforts during so many years, and thus justify the accusation of our adversaries, that Sardinia is unworthy and incapable of taking the lead in a

national movement; and that she will in the future, as she was in the past, be made a tool either of France or of Austria?" On the other hand, the upholders of the Western alliance advanced: "That of two foes, the stronger and more dangerous should be attacked the first; that Russia is far more to be dreaded than Austria, and that, if the Northern giant is once prostrated, the claws of the double-headed Austrian eagle will then become innocuous; that Austria has not yet manifested by a single act her attachment to the cause of the Western Powers, and that should she, sooner or later, openly declare in favour of Russia, Sardinia would at once gain enormous importance as an ally of France and England."

The gradual development of events proves the correctness of the latter view, and the longer the war continues, and the more countries it encompasses, the nearer the period approaches when Sardinia will fully enter upon her noble mission.

That Italy will always be liable to two opposite influences, the French and the German, is a fact sufficiently established by history; and these influences, owing to her geographical position, will not entirely cease even in the event of her recovering her independence; the great difference, however, will then be that Italy being free both in will

and deed, will possess the right to choose her friends, to make alliances and to defend her rights, sword in hand, whenever and by whomsoever they may be threatened.

In regard to the question as to what alliance would best suit her national feeling, her customs, hopes and sympathies in a quarrel which, though not touching directly upon her own affairs, does not from its general interest admit of her remaining neutral, we unhesitatingly say, an alliance with France. It matters not whether France bears the transitory title of a Republic, Kingdom, or Empire, neither the form under which that country may propagate civilisation, if she is only opposed to the policy of the Northern Powers.

The occupation of Rome, in 1849, was an unpardonable blunder of French policy, and a crime against the cause of Italy. It is to be hoped that France, in her future proceedings, will try to obliterate that stain upon her honour and not allow the hatred of the Italians to take too deep root; which would produce consequences equally fatal to both countries.

The present war in the East affords to the Italian troops an opportunity of showing to the world that they possess the same perseverance and valour as distinguished their ancestors throughout all ages and that though the people suffer the

foreign invasion, the fault is not so much with them as with the generally unfortunate condition of Europe.

If there is one thing more than another to be deplored, it is the inconsiderable number of the Italian auxiliary corps in the camp of the Allies. Italy, who from her twenty-five millions of inhabitants, her natural riches and glorious traditions, as well as the general state of culture and the spirit of the nation for all that is great and sublime, seems to be destined to play one of the most prominent parts in the present struggle, and ought to have a numerous army at her command, is now scarcely able to furnish 15,000 men, and even this small force can only be kept up by the subsidy of the Allies. This is a fearful evidence of the state of degradation and impotence to which Italy has been reduced by priestcraft and the rule of foreigners. Yet this apparently desperate condition, will change for the better as soon as the war of Cabinets expands to one of Principles; when Austria, by the pressure of events, will be compelled to show her true colours, and will, of course, throw herself into the arms of her natural ally, the Czar. Unfettered Italy would then bring up troops, at least equal to those of the Western Powers, namely: Sardinia 80,000, Naples 80,000, Tuscany 15,000, Rome 15,000, and the lesser States 10,000, making a total of 200,000

combatants. The Lombardo-Venetians would, in the first moment, be unable to muster a regular army, their levies, as a part of the Austrian army, being employed in garrisoning distant towns and provinces; this deficiency would, however, be made up by the numerous volunteers who would hasten to join the national standard. These forces might, moreover, be doubled in the course of a year by the establishment of a liberal constitution in all the countries bearing the name of Italy. Thus, in a decisive war against Russia and her confederates, Italy would take the field with an army superior to the united forces of France, England, and Turkey.

CONCLUSION.

THE Eastern crisis still continues without an appearance of a change for the better. And how can it be otherwise? Are not all the warlike operations of the Allies characterised by languor and vacillation, as well as by a succession of false moves, the natural consequences of half-measures? Thus, instead of their armies having gained ground their adversary is now relatively stronger, and more advantageously situated than he was at the beginning of the war. The precarious state of affairs in the Crimea, the utter inactivity on the Danube, and the victorious progress of the Russians in Asia, are the best evidence of how little the former have effected by following a course, which, besides involving such fearful sacrifice in blood and treasure, has done so much to damage their cause in the opinion of the continental nations.

It is to little purpose that the best troops are sent to a barren corner of the Crimea for the sake of

carrying on the work of Sisyphus. From thence they will never conquer Russia, never obtain the coveted object of the contest. If the Western Powers had no intention beyond that of foiling for the moment the Czar's schemes of aggrandisement, they might, instead of attacking him upon his own territory, as well from the very beginning have limited their warlike proceedings to supporting the Turkish army on land, and the blockading of the Russian shores, which would have been equally efficacious in securing the same result for which they are at present toiling before Sebastopol, viz., a peace which at the best will only establish the *status quo ante bellum*.

Who will deny that under these circumstances Russia must eventually be the gainer, whether the Allies drag on this kind of desultory warfare, or patch up a peace of expediency? From both she will derive the advantage of being considered inassailable on her borders as well as in the interior of her empire, and of increasing her influence throughout Europe. As to her designs upon Turkey she will postpone them for the first unguarded moment, when the "sick man," already debilitated by his present efforts and bewildered by the prescriptions of his friends, will fall an easy prey to her open or secret attacks.

It cannot be too strongly impressed upon the

Western people that a power which has attained such gigantic dimensions as Russia, cannot be brought to reason by a mere martial display or be vanquished by a mock war. The opposing of masses more formidable than those at her command can alone compel her to listen to the dictates of justice. This expedient was adopted by the European sovereigns when they found it advisable to coalesce against the universal dominion of Napoleon. The France of those days was too powerful to be humiliated by the purely military forces of the northern countries together with those of England. Owing to this simple but incontestable fact the monarchs unhesitatingly employed the very means that we now propose to the Western Governments, namely, the arraying the masses of the peoples against the common enemy. The dazzling promises which were then held out to them produced a magic effect. The nations, full of warlike ardour and dreams of independence, flocked in hundreds of thousands around the standard of their princes, their irresistible tide rolling on towards the frontiers of France, and finally overwhelming both the genius of Napoleon and the heroic resistance of the French.

Is it not passing strange that the English and French Governments in 1855 are afraid of having recourse to the same agencies, which the Holy

Alliance did not shrink from making use of against Napoleon in 1813 and 1814? Is the danger from the North less now than it was at that period from the West? Did not the thrones of Naples, Westphalia and other similar creations of the French autocrat—so soon subverted by the Allied sovereigns—possess at least as much legal foundation as the claims of Russia upon her share of the Polish territory? It would seem that the apprehension of a general political conflagration prevails in the cabinets of London and Paris. We believe that as far as the nations are concerned, whose aid is requisite to repel Russia, such an apprehension is without foundation; for they are wholly unacquainted with the social questions which agitate the West of Europe, and all they desire is the restoration of their national independence, as established and sanctioned by the laws and customs of centuries.

As soon as the Allies change their present watchword "the integrity of Turkey" for "the liberation of the oppressed nationalities," they will have one million of combatants at their disposal. The national forces of Poland, Hungary and Italy, supported by England and France, Sweden and Turkey, will then stand forth to destroy for ever Russian preponderance on the continent.

We, therefore, say: Either a real and decisive

war against Russia or no war at all. For of what use are those wanton devastations along the shores of the Baltic, the Euxine and the Sea of Azoff; or the undermining of the prosperity of millions for years to come, and the obstructing of the progress of culture, industry and commerce, if the whole result to be hoped for is an unsafe peace?

We once more repeat that the pending question can only be favourably solved before a forum of the nations most concerned in it, and this solution must necessarily be preceded by the following moves:

1. The speedy recall of the Crimean expedition, and the transfer of the principal seat of war in the East to the Danube.

2. The landing of an army in the Baltic provinces and the securing an alliance with Sweden.

3. The restoration of a mighty Poland.

4. The repudiation of Austrian neutrality by summoning her to declare *for* or *against*. And in the event of her joining the enemy—which can scarcely any longer be doubted—the formation of a Danubian Confederation to include all the provinces, not German, along that river, with Hungary as their centre.

5. The simultaneous liberation of Italy.

6. The employment of all the Turkish forces in Asia.

We cannot conclude this sketch without offering our tribute of admiration to the truly antique heroism and self-sacrifice which distinguishes the warlike exploits of the Allied troops, and which will secure them a glorious and immortal memory in the history of all future ages.

THE END.

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
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